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INTRODUCTION
The themes of incursion and boundary-crossing unite dispa-
rate legal domains. Wherever human beings cross paths and share
space, law or law-like traditions develop to regulate this terrain by
distinguishing permitted from proscribed intrusion.' Crimes and
torts, regulation and liability, claims and defenses to claims, pri-
vate law and public law all use a variety of measures-punish-
ments, administrative rules, equitable remedies, professional disci-
pline, and informal or extralegal sanctions-to condemn undue ag-
gression.2 Concern about aggression may be found in the law of
every jurisdiction in the United States. 3
1. See KNUD S. LARSEN, AGGRESSION: MYTHS AND MODELS 39 (1976) ("From the beginning
of recorded history, scholars, researchers, and laymen alike have been concerned about human
aggression."); see also AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL
CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW xiii (1979) (predicting that
aggression will exist "as long as human beings with their egoistic interests survive"). One exam-
ple of conduct condemned for millennia as too aggressive is usury. See, e.g., David J. Gerber,
Prometheus Born" The High Middle Ages and the Relationship Between Law and Economic Con.
duct, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 673, 703 (1994) (contending that the prohibition of usury was "the
single most important economic conduct norm" in the late Middle Ages). For the Biblical prohi-
bitions, see Exodus 22:25; Leviticus 25:35-38; Deuteronomy 23:30.
2. Focusing primarily on formal control of, and redress for, aggression, this Article pays
only passing attention to extralegal measures that achieve comparable effects. A leading author.
ity on "order without law" points out several informal practices that limit aggressive behaviors.
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows,
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1178 & n.51 (1996) (noting norms limiting the
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Within American law, an extra increment of aggression can
amount to the only difference between condoned and condemned
behavior. Panhandling, for instance, enjoys First Amendment pro-
tection,4 but states may ban aggressive panhandling.5 The crimes of
harassment and stalking similarly identify aggression as that
which makes tolerated conduct (call it courtship?) no longer toler-
able.6 Antitrust law exalts competition,7 fully aware that human
amount of time one may spend at a drinking fountain, a public telephone, and a playground
basketball court, as well as "academic norms" that constrain students from "talking at excessive
length in class" or "remaining for too many years in graduate study"); id. at 1184 (suggesting
that scenic parks are "suitable for quick tourist stops and brief romantic strolls," not loitering
and lingering).
3. The condemnation extends from local court rules to international law. Compare RIFAAT,
supra note 1, at 223-80 (cataloguing international law stances against aggression), with John S.
Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. $05, 571-85 (2000)
(noting efforts of local court rules to address over-aggressive discovery). Jurisdictions have re-
sponded in different ways in attempting to control overly aggressive attorneys. Se, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing for sanctions against an attorney who "unreasonably and vexa-
tiously ... multiplies the proceedings in any case"); Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286-89 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (declaring a mandatory code of professionalism for
the Northern District of Texas that would discourage unduly combative litigation styles); Pro-
posed Standards for Professional Conduct within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, reprinted
in FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMTTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDIcIAL CIRCUIT,
143 F.R.D. 441 app. A at 448 (1992) (proposing rules that prohibit rude and belligerent behavior
by attorneys); see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself- A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 ALL U. L. REV. 1337, 1343 n.9 (1997) (quoting
president of Florida bar, who "defined professionalism as the opposite of'eat or he eaten'); Gary
VL Farmer, Civility and Professionalism in Legal Advocacy, 23 NOVA L REV. 809, 815-16 (1999)
(commending understatement and "the whisper" to lawyers).
4. In Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Cir-
cuit invalidated a city-wide ban on begging, agreeing with the petitioners' First Amendment
claim that the ban deprived beggars of all means to express their message. See also Young v.
New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153-57 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding ban on begging in
public transit facilities, while conceding that begging involves "expressive conduct"); Los Angeles
Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, 987 F. Supp. 819, 830-31 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (refusing
to enjoin plaintiffs from their practice of solicitation), affd, 224 F.3d 1076, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000);
Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322-25 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (declaring unconstitutional a
statute that prohibited accosting for purposes of begging), rev'd on other grounds, 38 F.3d 1514
(9th Cir. 1994); cf. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980)
(holding that charitable solicitation is protected speech under the First Amendment).
5. See City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1334-35 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 908 (1991); Charles Mitchell, Note, Aggressive Panhandling Legislation and Free Speech
Claims: Begging for Trouble, 39 N.Y.L SCR. L. REV. 697, 698 (1994) (defending the distinction).
6. Seventeen states criminalize harassment on the street or in public areas. ALA. CODE §
13 A-11-8 (Supp. 1997); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2921 (West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-208 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111
(Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311 (Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106 (1993);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7 (Vest Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.070 (Michie 1990); MD.
ANN. CODE art. xxvii, § 121A (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:33-4 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-2 (Michie Supp. 1998); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065 (1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2709 (West Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1997). All fifty states
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beings will suffer, and firms fail, in its name, while deeming preda-
tion bad enough to warrant a treble-damages civil penalty.8 Em-
ployment law rests on the premise that labor is bought and sold in
a market;9 in southern California, cradle of American trends, some
municipalities set a national example by making it illegal for work-
ers to solicit employment from motorists.'0 The United Nations
charter, which presumes-without condemnation-that nations
pursue agendas that conflict with what other nations pursue, also
declares that a country violates international law when it commits
an act of aggression." Many localities prohibit "solicitation" of pros-
and the District of Columbia criminalize stalking, and interstate stalking is a federal offense.
Jennifer L. Bradfield, Anti-Stalking Laws: Do They Adequately Protect Stalking Victims?, 21
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 244 (1998).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951); see also Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive
Instrument of Progress, 14 U. Ci. L. REV. 567, 570 (1947) (linking together "capitalism," "compe-
tition," and "the antitrust tradition").
8. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) C'[A]ny person who shall be injured in his busi.
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue.., and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained ...."); Utah Pie Co. v. Contl Baking Co., 386
U.S. 685, 702-03 (1967) (recognizing predatory pricing claim brought under the Robinson-
Patman Act). An important article described predatory pricing as a device that violates the
Sherman Act when it is used to achieve monopolization. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
697, 697 (1975). Of all the examples of legal condemnation of aggression addressed in this Arti.
cle, which I offer to explore the line between accepted and unaccepted incursions, only the anti.
trust concept of predation has provoked a vigorous outcry-about definitions, policies, line.
drawing, and the like-among specialists. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:
A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 144, 149-55, passim (rev. ed. 1993) (maintaining that predatory
pricing, as well as other types of predation, almost never exists); Frank H. Easterbrook, Preda-
tory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CI. L. REV. 263, 265-76 (1981) (using microeco-
nomic theory to contend that remedies for predation should be very limited); see also Roland H.
Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105,
123 (1971) (calling predation a "popular myth"); Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing?
From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1052, 1054 (1986) (contending
that almost no predatory pricing claim deserves to get past summary judgment). Below I try to
explain how and why antitrust won this unique distinction.
9. See Walsh v. Arrow Air, Inc., 629 So. 2d 144, 145-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (summa-
rizing justifications of employment at will), quashed and remanded, 645 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla.
1994); Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27, 40-41 (1996) (defending employment at will with reference to the market for em-
ployment).
10. See Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson on "Chronic Misconduct" in Urban Spaces: Of Pan.
handlers, Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 33-38 (1997); see
also David Rosenzweig, Federal Judge Voids Ban on Soliciting by Day Laborers, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2000, at BI (reporting judicial decision).
11. The Charter does not define this term, RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 117, but definitions have
been attempted elsewhere, notably in a General Assembly resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (defining aggression, rather opaquely,
as "the use of armed force by a State against... another State, in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations").
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titution, while tolerating exchanges of sex for money that do not
contain the element of approach to a passive recipient. 12 Lawyers
are expected to work hard to garner new "business,"13 but they must
do so without explicit overtures to prospective clients: Professional
authorities frown on advertising, and also discipline lawyers for
solicitation, 14 which is said to be "fraught with the possibility of un-
due influence, intimidation, and overreaching." 5 Although attorney
influence-some would go further aid substitute "client depend-
ency"-is a sine qua non of the lawyer-client relationship, 6 it must
not reach a level that regulators will deem undue.
Elsewhere the same adjective separates permitted from pro-
scribed conduct. In the name of undue influence, gratuitous trans-
fers, especially wills, may be nulified;17 courts deem contracts void-
12. See Marjorie E. Murphy, A Question of Procurement, Not Prostitution, 87 COLUM4. L.
REv. 1075, 1076 (1987) (book review) (contrasting state statutes that criminalize sex "for hire"
with those that criminalize solicitation); see also Laura Reanda, Prostitution as a Human Rights
Question: Problems and Prospects of United Nations Action, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 202, 203 (1991)
(noting that some countries, including Canada and Thailand, permit sex-for-money exchanges
while prohibiting solicitation). In a recent decision, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
state could criminalize the "solicitation of sodomy," notwithstanding its 1998 holding that the
state could not criminalize sodomy per se. Laura Brown, Regulating Sex S. VOICE, Mar. 9, 2000,
at 1.
13. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice." The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law Commencement, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (lamenting
the transformation of law "from a profession to a business"); see also Marc Galanter & Thomas
M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger. The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth of
Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 752 n.22 (1990) (noting that many law firms now employ
"marketing directors," a job title "unknown even in 1980").
14. Hope Viner Samborn, Cloudy Standards for Rainmaking, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1998, at 30
(noting that only four United States jurisdictions permit in-person solicitation by lawyers); see
also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-34 (1995) (upholding limited ban on direct
mail solicitation); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978) (holding that a law-
yer's free speech rights do not extend to in-person solicitation). Surveys show that most lawyers
"oppose mass media advertising," while most nonlawyers find lawyer advertising both helpful
and "professionally acceptable". GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION. RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 392 (3d ed. 1994). Turn-of-the.twventieth-century
ethical canons prohibited lawyers from advertising, but since 1977 courts have held that the
First Amendment gives lawyers a qualified right to" advertise. See generally NATHAN K,
CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMIS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 532-37
(1996) (summarizing regulatory traditions and Supreme Court case law).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 1 (1983).
16. On client dependency, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107, 2128-29 (1991). See generally Ivan
Illich, Disabling Professions, in DISABLING PROFESSIONS 11 (1978) (exploring dependency thesis
for all professions).
17. Undue influence as a basis for nullifying a will originated with fountain v. Bennet, 29
Eng. Rep. 1200, 1211 (Ch. 1787), where the court entered judgment against Mrs. Bennet widow
of the testator, after a jury found that her influence over her husband amounted to coercion.
Disinherited relatives and disappointed charities continue to benefit from this basis for nullify-
ing a will. See In re Estate of McCoy, 844 P.2d 1131, 1134-37 (Alaska 1993); Estate of Lakatosh,
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able;' 8 restitution becomes available to claimants.19 A similar notion
of too much aggression pervades the contract doctrine of uncon-
scionability. You may drive a hard bargain if you like, judges tell
potential aggressors, 20 but too hard a bargain might constitute what
one court called "carrying a good joke too far."21
Undue influence has parallels in criminal law. Duress, for
example, exculpates defendants whose mental state and conduct
would otherwise fulfill the elements of many crimes. 22 Duress is a
function of human aggression. Poverty, hunger, political fervor, ro-
mantic love, or strong family loyalties might generate a sense of
compulsion that feels as strong as duress, but without a human ag-
gressor to blame, the defendant who wants an excuse based on
656 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). For a discussion of the distinction between influence
and undue influence, see Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 574
(1997).
18: Women who surrendered their children for adoption have been permitted to reclaim
them when the relinquishment resulted from undue influence. See In re Cheryl E., 207 Cal.
Rptr. 728, 735-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Caballero v. Robertson, 737 So. 2d 1144, 1148 (Fla, Dist.
Ct. App. 1999); Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y, 367 A.2d 1168, 1175 (N.J. 1976); Meth-
odist Mission Home of Tex. v. B., 451 S.W.2d 539, 543-53 (Tex. App. 1970). In Odorizzi v.
Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966), a schoolteacher was arrested
on criminal charges of homosexual activity. Agents of his employer came to his apartment after
he was released and, when he was under acute stress and deprived of sleep, persuaded him to
sign a resignation statement by telling him "there wasn't time to consult an attorney" and "if he
didn't resign at once the school would... dismiss him from his position and publicize the pro-
ceedings." Id. at 543. The California Court of Appeals held that the resignation agreement was
voidable, deeming the defendant school board "a dominant subject' and the plaintiff "a servient
object." Id. at 540.
19. Several cases involve gifts to churches. See, e.g., In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628,
642-43 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff, a Dayton-Hudson heiress, stated a claim for
restitution of more than a million dollars in gifts); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification
of World Christianity, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1123-24 (1988) (upholding plaintiffs claim for restitution
of a $6000 gift made to the Unification Church). See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 70
(1937) (providing that restitution is one of the remedies available when contracts are made un-
der undue influence).
20. See, e.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. App. 1949) (enforcing a con-
tract to sell $25 worth of Greek currency for $1000); First Nael Bank v. Nennig, 285 N.W.2d 614,
624 (Wis. 1979) (refusing to invalidate sale of a farm by a woman to her cousin for less than fair
market value); see also WILLIAM BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440
(asserting that even a peppercorn may be sufficient consideration for a lease).
21. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948). See also O'Neill v. Do.
Laney, 415 N.E.2d 1260, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (refusing to enforce contract to buy a painting
for $10; the painting was either an "unauthenticated Rubens" worth $100,000, or an authenti-
cated Rubens worth several hundred thousand dollars); Jackson v. Seymour, 71 S.E.2d 181, 185-
86 (Va. 1952) (permitting indigent widow to rescind sale of a parcel of land to her brother, who
had kept silent about its true value). For a summary of contemporary cases in which courts
found contract terms unconscionable, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 44-50 (1996).
22. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1985).
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compulsion is usually out of luck.23 Human aggressors can matter to
defendants in another context: When a government agent induces a
person to commit an offense, that person is entitled to the defense
of entrapment.24 Although courts and scholars disagree on the ques-
tion of which theory supports the entrapment defense, an element
of undue aggression is prominent in both of the major rationales.2
The same theme of aggression and aggressors as distin-
guishing elements resurfaces in the crime of blackmail. Often it is
perfectly lawful for a person, D, to possess embarrassing informa-
tion about another, V; for D to share this information with the
world, if he chooses; and for V to convey money to D, if he chooses.
Nevertheless it is unlawful for D to propose a contract whereby V
would convey money to D and in return D would refrain from telling
the world what he knows about V.26 Neither silence, nor disclosure,
23. When she can, the defendant might resort to "necessity," which dispenses with the re-
quirement 6f an agent of aggression. The lodel Penal Code provides that an actor may assert a
defense of necessity when "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than
that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged," provided that statutory law
defining the offense does not address "the specific situation involved" and no "legislative purpose
to exclude the justification" appears. Id. § 3.02. When a defendant experiences compulsion of
the kind mentioned in the text--compulsion not linked to a human aggressor who coerces--ne-
cessity will seldom fit the facts. Although in principle necessity is stronger than duress (it is a
justification, whereas duress is an excuse, and it applies to all crimes, even murder, whereas
opinion is divided on whether duress ought to apply to serious crimes) it is so narrow as to be
almost never available. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1980) (ruling against
defendants and noting in dictum that necessity seldom justifies acquittal); 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIINAL LAW DEFENSES 143 (1984) (noting limited applicability of the defense); cf. Thomas H.
Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1405 (1985) (con-
templating, but not endorsing, the proposition that offers to extend credit to vulnerable individu-
als may be too seductive to refuse, and thus constitute a kind of duress).
24. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 509-10.
25. The Supreme Court has stated that entrapment exists when a government official ma-
nipulates into criminal activity a defendant who had "no predisposition" to commit a crime.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458 (1932); see also Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S.
540, 553 (1992) (determining that the defendant did not have in "independent" predisposition to
commit the crime). In such a scenario, Professor Robinson explains, the defendant is passive in
his interactions with officialdom; the defendants criminal actions are "not fully his own," and
entrapment becomes an excuse resembling duress. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 513. An alter-
native rationale condemns entrapment as police misconduct. Under this "objective" or "nonex-
culpatory" version of the defense, the defendant deserves condemnation, but government is more
blameworthy because of its "overreaching," Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), or because of "impermissible police conduct," People v. Moran, 463
P.2d 763, 768 (Cal. 1970) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), notwithstanding rationalizations grounded
in "sinister sophism," People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979). In short, the entrapment
defense protects defendants from overly aggressive state actors.
26. Avast literature has expounded on the anomaly of criminalizing blackmail within a le-
gal regime that applauds consensual transactions, even where one of the parties feels pressured,
reluctant, or uneasy. The work of James Lindgren is especially significant James Lindgren,
Blackmaik On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L REV. 597, 598 (1989); James Lind-
gren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L REV. 670 passim (1984). Other reflec-
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nor conveying money, nor possessing embarrassing information is
criminal: The law proscribes an act of aggression. 27
Alongside these condemnations of aggression, however,
American law also reveals a contrary inclination to favor initiative
and enterprise. When Oliver Wendell Holmes argued in 1881 that
accident rules should tend to favor active defendants rather than
passive plaintiffs because "the public generally profits from indi-
vidual activity,"28 he expressed a view that had by then long influ-
enced American thought,29 one that endures today.3 0 Legal doctrine
evinces an appreciation of the freedom to act, while also appreciat-
ing the freedom to be free from the acts of others; initiative is es-
teemed within the law as a source of social welfare.8 1 Aggression
conduces to wealth and so, for the sake of this gain, societies must
condone its being used instrumentally.32
tions on the anomaly include RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 660-61 (5th ed.
1998); Ronald H. Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 665-76 (1988); Douglas H. Ginsburg &
Paul Shechtman, Blackmai" An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1865-74
(1993).
27. See Russell Hardin, Blackmailing for Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1805
(1993) (concluding that both sides of a blackmail transaction might profit from the exchange),
28. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 83 (1881).
29. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 19 (1776) (praising entrepreneurial initiative); Doyne Dawson, The Origins of War:
Biological and Anthropological Theories, 35 HIST. & THEORY 1, 3-13 (1996) (expounding the view
of Malthus, shared to some degree by Hobbes, that groups and individuals can benefit from oven
the most destructive aggression, including murder and war). "Social Darwinism," associated
with Herbert Spencer, celebrated aggressive individuals and associated their forcefulness with
societal gain. See PETER GAY, THE CULTIVATION OF HATRED 41 (1993) (noting that it was
Spencer, not Darwin, who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest"); Robert C. Whittemore, The
Philosophical Antecedents of American Ideology, in IDEOLOGY AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 13, 22-
26 (John K. Roth & Robert C. Whittemore eds., 1986) (tracing origins of "the freedom to do one's
best").
30. See LINDA R. COHEN & ROGER G. NOLL, THE TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 378 (1991) (ar-
guing that only individual initiative, not government-directed research and development, yields
technological advances); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
RooTs OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 231-81 (1994) (advocating changes in the law that
would permit institutional owners to engage in active management); Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a
Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 247 (1997) (recommending that
law schools teach entrepreneurship, focusing on small businesses, to advance "social and eco-
nomic justice").
31. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 6-7 (2d ed. 1990) (noting tenet that "direct bi-
lateral exchanges" initiated by individuals promote "the efficient use of economic resources," and
that as a consequence of such exchanges, "society as a whole benefits").
32. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 882 (Neb. 1902) (shrugging off,
in the name of progress, the fact that the use of dangerous machinery "occasionally results in the
loss of life or limb"); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873) CWe must have factories, ma-
chinery, dams, canals, and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind,
and lay at the basis of all our civilization.").
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Thus markets line up against stasis, 33 risk against safety,34 a
"national anthem" of enterprise 5 against a jurisprudential tradition
celebrating "the passive virtues," 36 and nonconsensual engagement
with others against a posited right (perhaps a constitutional right,
no less) to be let alone.3 7 Because each half of these dichotomies has
a basis in traditions of justice, aggression occupies an ambiguous
place in American legal doctrine. Entire doctrines of unlawful ag-
gression, as was noted, condemn incursion ambivalently, without
articulating fundamentals.38 As projects for law and lawyers, both
understanding the meaning of aggression and ranking the consid-
erations relevant to its control remain puzzlingly obscure.
To highlight these difficulties of classification and descrip-
tion, Table 1 lists in columns most of the doctrines mentioned above
to illustrate the role of aggression in distinguishing condoned (and
sometimes even applauded) behavior from prohibited intrusions:
33. Cf. ROBERT KUTrNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LziTS OF MARKETS 5
(1997) (claiming that dismay over 1970s "stagflation" helped to generate the current fashion,
laissez-faire economic libertarianism).
34. See generally JULES L. COIiMAN, RISKS AND VRONGS (1992).
35. STUART M. SPEISER, LAWYERS AND THE AMERICAN DREI 9 (1993) (quoting ELIZABETH
LONG, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE POPULAR NOVEL (1985)).
36. Alexander MVL Bickel, Foreword. The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42-47 (1961)
(contending that judges should avoid deciding cases that pose a danger of conflict among the
branches of government); see also ALEXANDER X. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 116-21 (2d ed. 1962) (advocating judicial restraint).
37. The right to be let alone is asserted in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Although judicial authors invoke it most often in dissents, the
Brandeis phrase appears now and then on the winning side. See, eg., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 758 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects a defendant from being compelled
to undergo surgery to extract a bullet from his body; prosecutors wanted the bullet as evidence).
38. See supra notes 4-27 and accompanying text. Here I do not mean to hold the concept of
aggression to a standard that other pivotal legal nouns and adjectives---intent," "reasonable,"
statutory or discriminatory "purpose," "notorious," "malice," and the like--cannot meet. Nor
should one pick quantitative nits-how much is much? how undue, excessive, or intrusive is
undue, excessive, or intrusive?-that refer to nothing worse than nuance or inevitable ambiguity
from case to case. See Steven J. Johansen, WIat Does Ambiguous Mean? Making Sense of Statu-
tory Analysis in Oregon, 34 WILLAMTrE L. REV. 219, 264-67 (1998); Ollivette E. Mencer Un-
clear Consequences: The Ambient Ambiguity, 22 S.U. L REv. 217, 221 (1995) (lamenting ambi-
guity in legal writing but deeming it ineradicable). The imprecision and obscurity about aggres-
sion in the law is more fundamental See infra Part 11 (contrasting legal ambiguity with social-
science clarity about what is at stake in defining aggression).
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Table 1
Examples of Aggression as a Distinction in Legal Categories
Area of Law Condoned Version Condemned Version
ANTITRUST Competition Predation
CONTRACTS [absence of defense or] undue influence
merely unequal bar- duress
gaining power unconscionability
application for employ- solicitation of employment
ment by day laborers
GRATUITOUS [absence of basis to undue influence
TRANSFERS nullify transfer]
CRIMINAL LAW [absence of defense] duress
banter, badinage, flat- harassment
tery, courtship
courtship, friendly over- stalking
tures
contract blackmail/extortion
[absence of defense] entrapment
panhandling or charita- aggressive panhandling
ble solicitation
PROFESSIONAL business development solicitation
RESPONSIBILITY
PUBLIC national defense, self- aggression
INTERNATIONAL defense
LAW
The division between behaviors that the law condones and
those it condemns-the aggression boundary line-occupies this
Article.3 9 I make three claims. The first is that in order for the divi-
sion to become intelligible, the law needs to understand aggression.
39. The philosopher Alan Wertheimer explores a related interest in the division between
condoned and condemned action, using the longstanding taboo against sexual relations between
physician and patient as a way to understand exploitation in general. See WERTHEIMER, supra
note 21, at 159-60. The Hippocratic oath forbids "sexual deeds upon bodies of females and
males," id. at 159, causing Wertheimer to query why this profession (more than others) has pro-
scribed sex with its clientele. Wertheimer concludes that the fine line between condoned and
condemned behaviors of the physician's work day-between "professional palpation" and "im-
proper fondling," id. at 160, for instance-heightens the need to define and proscribe. So too I
argue that although aggression is of pervasive interest throughout the law, the divisions between
condoned and condemned incursions generate the most acute definitional obligations.
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Whereas other disciplines have expounded on this subject, the law40
currently lacks even a working definition of the term. The second
claim concerns which framework to use in building a theory of ag-
gression in the law. Here I suggest that we find help from what
may seem an unlikely source in legal doctrine. As elaborated in
Part I, legal condemnation of aggression, most of which falls outside
the confines of tort law,41 becomes clearer and more consistent with
the help of tort theory. The necessary concepts, which appear espe-
cially crucial within tort scholarship and case law, are
"reciprocity"42 and "utility."43
Though abundantly noted elsewhere, 44 reciprocity first
gained fame in torts with the 1972 publication of Fairness and Util-
ity in Tort Theory by George Fletcher.45 In his celebrated article,
40. Here I use the word "law" in its broadest sense, and mean to include judicial opinions,
statutes, stated judicial proclivities, legal scholarship, journalism, and popular discourse about
the law.
41. Table 1 could have included a few torts examples--nuisance, outrage, consent, privacy,
or punitive damages, far example, but torts comes only belatedly to mind when one think of
aggression in the law.
42. Although my link between th; concepts of aggression and reciprocity is novel in the le-
gal literature, social scientists have posited various relations between the two. See, e.g., ASHLEY
MONTAGU, THE NATURE OF HUMAN AGGRESSION 137-52 (1976) (suggesting that both aggression
and reciprocity are necessary for human survival); Frans B.M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee's Sense
of Social Regularity and Its Relation to the Human Sense of Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE:
BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 241, 248 (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992)
(explaining angry behaviors among apes as failures of reciprocity); William Michael Hall & Rob-
ert B. Cairns, Aggressive Behavior in Children: An Outcome of Modeling or Social Reciprocity?
20 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL 739, 741 (1984) (describing violent behaviors as reactions); Robert
L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 49-50 (1971) (noting
adaptive value of reciprocity as a bulwark against aggression).
43. The meanings of "utility," "utilitarianism," and "consequentialism" remain debated in
philosophy. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO B THICS 89-90 (1972); see
also infra note 113 and accompanying text.
44. Diverse literatures in philosophy, sociology, and anthropology yield not so much a defi-
nition of reciprocity as a flavor of what reciprocity might demand or encourage. See L4,WNCE C.
BECKER, RECIPROCITY 73 (1986) (philosophy of obligation); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APr
FEELINGS 261-69 (1990) (philosophy of moral sentiments); JOHN RALs, POLITICAL LIBERALI
16 (1993) (political philosophy); GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SrIMEL 388-95 (Kurt
IL Wolff ed. & trans., 1950) (arguing that moral obligations arise from indebtedness); Alvin NV.
Gouldner, Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory, in SY.POSIUM ON SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 241, 249 (Llewellyn Gross ed., 1959) (discussing reciprocity in functionalist perspective);
see also CLAUDE LVI-STRAUSS, THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY, reprinted in SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 77 (Lewis A. Coser & Bernard Rosenberg eds., 1975); BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME
AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 46-49 (1926) (deeming reciprocity the center of social relation-
ships); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT 63 (1954) (describing indebtedness that results from the accep-
tance of a gift); Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 343, 348 (1972)
(discussing reciprocity as part of welfare economics).
45. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L REV. 537, 540-46
(1972) [hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness]. Fletcher's original title was "Non-Reciprocal Risk-
Taking-A Synthesis and Critique of the Principles of Tort Liabilityf CHARLES FRIED, AN
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Fletcher argued that what he called the "paradigm of reciprocity"
explains and justifies the law of accidents better than its competi-
tor, the more familiar-to-torts paradigm of "reasonableness" or
"utility."4 Standing in respectively for Kantian moral theory and
utilitarianism or economic efficiency, 47 these two poles represent
the two choices lawyers, judges, and scholars face when deciding
how to approach accident cases. Fletcher reduces the dilemma to a
sentence: "The conflict is whether judges should look solely at the
claims and interests of the parties before the court, or resolve
seemingly private disputes in a way that serves the interests of the
community as a whole." 48
This dilemma extends well beyond torts, and so I argue in
Part I that the reciprocity-and-utility framework yields wider appli-
cations. But torts is a good place to start.4 Among various legal
doctrines it is tort law-charged with the task of mediating conflicts
between strangers, invoked only when summoned by hurt plaintiffs,
mindful that every repression connotes another person's freedom
and every freedom entails repression 5 0-that has best kept in focus
the essential nature of aggression. Tort law insists that aggression
is always a relational function. Like all behaviors that may be
deemed "tortious conduct," aggression is costly to proscribe yet
costly to leave undisturbed by regulation and proscription.5 1
ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 257 (1970) (citing draft ver-
sion of Fairness and Utility).
46. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at 539-43. Gregory Keating takes issue with
Fletcher's treating "reasonableness" as synonymous with utilitarianism, arguing that Hantian
precepts are equally reasonable. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negli-
gence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-14 (1996).
47. But see Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Eva-
lution, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 723, 726-27 (1984) (claiming that "utilitarianism reconciles autonomy
and reciprocity").
48. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at 540.
49. See generally ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999) (in-
voking reciprocity first to explain tort law, then later to explain criminal law and distributive
justice).
50. See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1990)
(musing, in dicta, that perhaps the plaintiff could be required to get out of the defendanes way,
rather than vice versa); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972)
(en bane) (fashioning "compensated injunction" as a way to mediate between the competing, zero-
sum rights of the plaintiff and defendant). Regarding individual liability for sexual harassment,
a tort-like problem, Nancy Ehrenreich has written that the freedom to be free from harassment
may be envisioned as a mirror of the freedom to harass. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths
and Powerless Men The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1177, 1222-25 (1990).
51. Judge Posner, the author of the Indiana Harbor decision, has made repeated reference
to the relational nature of injury and freedom in tort law. See Chicago Council of Lawyers,
Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAU L. REV. 673,
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Although it is tort theory that gave legal thought its most
generative (though perhaps also its most misleading) insight into
aggression, the Coase theorem, 52 it is also tort theory-led by
Fletcher's paradigms of reciprocity and utility-that best remedies
the pervasive Coasean indifference to a key query: Who has done
what to whom? Devotees of the theorem may continue to maintain,
pace Coase, that noses are just as responsible as punches for
punches in the nose;5 3 the law values the contrary view, respecting
limits-ends-in-themselves-as well as aggregate utility. For our
purpose the stance is particularly evident in such concepts as "ag-
gressive panhandling" and "undue influence," which advert (in their
noun) to gain and insist (in their adjective) that attention to aggre-
gation will not supersede a concern with boundaries.
A study of aggression as it is understood outside of the law
reveals the relevance and value of both the reciprocity and utility
paradigms. Part II of this Article begins by juxtaposing extralegal
insights into aggression with the particular needs of law. A lawyer
can relate reciprocity and utility to social science as well as legal
rules by culling and pruning the insights of psychology, anthropol-
ogy, criminology, sociology and theology. Posing the query, "What is
aggression?," Part II uses interdisciplinary insights to build a
working definition, in aid of the law-centered framework that struc-
tures this Article.
Overlapping conceptions of aggression, in law and often out-
side it, yield three defining elements. Taken in what I contend is
the correct sequence, they are: first, a perception or feeling of
wrongful invasion on the part of the target, or class of likely tar-
810-11 (1994) (noting Posner's oft-stated view that whereas the Constitution protects negative
liberties only, tort law faults actors for sins of omission as well as commission).
52. Coase adverts to reciprocity, in aid of utility.
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and
what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are
dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would in-
flict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be al-
lowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). Although George Fletcher
has questioned whether the Coase theorem is really about torts or tort theory, see generally
George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1658 (1993) (book review),
Coases famous article is replete with examples from English and American nuisance law.
Coase, supra, at 8-15, 24-26. Coase also quotes from the Prosser torts treatise at some length, id.
at 19-20, and analyzes liability for "the actions of rabbits," id. at 36.
53. I distort their point, but only a little. To investigate whether I am being unfair, see su-
pra note 50; see also Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior. Railroad
Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 15-19 (1988) (describing negligence law as a
proving ground for strategic behavior among both victims and injurors); Mark F. Grady, Proxi-
mate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWAL REv. 363, 414 (1984).
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gets; second, a trespass by the initiator; and third, a judgment,
reached by a society or community, that this combination of inva-
sion and trespass on balance warrants condemnation. 54 The point
may be made with reference to a relation among players: the recipi-
ent, who wants to be free of all unwelcome encroachment; the ag-
gressor, who wants to pursue her own agenda unfettered; 5 and so-
cieties or communities, which try to take these competing desires
into account by comparing them to each other. This commonsensical
description comports with Fletcher's model. One can readily see the
paradigm of fairness in the first two elements which advert to feel-
ings or desires, or what I will call sentiments, while the third ele-
ment suggests a complementary paradigm of aggregate utility.56
Again, the vocabulary of torts will aid analysis, not only to define
aggression but also to exclude some misconceptions about the sub-
ject. The tripartite scheme indicates, in a general way, where the
law will condemn aggression and where it will refrain from con-
demnation.57
Having delineated reciprocity, utility, and aggression as
elements of law and legal rules, the Article moves on to consider
this analysis in aid of its third thesis: Understanding aggression
yields descriptive and normative gains. Part III addresses aggres-
sion as taxonomy. A family relation, I argue, unites those legal
categories that set up dichotomous contrasts between permitted
and proscribed aggression. Conventional doctrinal categories do not
take note of this relation. If my taxonomy is correct, and the family
relations among disparate topics genuine,58 then the jurisprudential
54. These elements are conjunctive, or more precisely cumulative, so that aggression
emerges when all three are satisfied in turn.
55. Although the tripartite analysis yields a legal conclusion of aggression only when all
three elements are fulfilled, see infra Part III, I refer to the entity suspected of aggression as "the
aggressor," usually without hedging adjectives like "alleged" or "putative," for the sake of con-
venience and brevity. In the end, the law may applaud her conduct.
56. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 358-60
(1978) (claiming that the common law is most successful when it combines attention to reciproc-
ity with a sense of what functions best as social practice).
57. On rare occasions, the law will condemn as aggressive certain behaviors that do not ful-
fill the three defining elements; but these exceptions usually indicate an underlying difficulty
with the condemnation. See infra Part III.B.
58. Compare JOHN DOLLARD ET AL., FRUSTRATION AND AGGRESSION 1 (1939) CThe problem
of aggression has many facets .... This book represents an attempt to bring a degree of system-
atic order into such apparently chaotic phenomena."), with JOHN KLAMA, AGGRESSION: THE
MYTH OF THE BEAST WITHIN 152 (1988) (contending that aggression "is not a single thing, nor yet
a single class of things; it is not a single behaviour pattern, nor yet a single class of behaviour
patterns; rather, it is a single term, with a great variety of possible uses and misuses"), and
Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-eighth Session of the International Law Commission, 91 AM. J.
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principle of treating like cases alike mandates attention to these
associations. 59 The taxonomy can offer guidance to judges and
scholars who address recurring questions of doctrine.
Part IV explores two radical applications for the reciprocity-
and-utility paradigm-one of which George Fletcher himself has
noted, albeit without much interest, in an essay about domination
that revisits the themes of Fairness and Utility. "The kind of domi-
nance I have in mind," he writes,
is not class dominance of the sort asserted in the Marxist description of capitalism;
nor is it akin to the alleged dominance of women by men, or blacks by whites.
These instances of status-dominance are undoubtedly unjust and wrong. If the
dominance exists, then surely those subordinated would wish to take democratic or
even revolutionary measures in response.60
Whereupon Fletcher exits, leaving behind what I regard as an invi-
tation to consider reciprocity-and-utility as an intellectual weapon
to fight the subordination of groups. 61
Accordingly, Part IV begins by examining certain achieve-
ments of the American civil rights movement using the vocabulary
of aggression, reciprocity, and utility.62 The work of Martin Luther
King, Jr. and his colleagues, evoking "nonviolence" as a source of
racial justice, expressed the relational nature of aggression. Having
portrayed themselves as recipients of antecedent aggression-
IN'LL. 365, 366 (1997) (quoting United Nations rapporteur Jean Spiropoulos: aggression "is not
susceptible of definition").
59. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131a-1131b (Terence Irwin trans., 1985) (stat-
ing this thesis as a crucial constituent of justice); IHL.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LVI 155 (1961)
(deeming the phrase "[t]reat like cases like [and treat different cases differently]* a "leading
precept" of justice). Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 165-66 (1986) (arguing that law must
hew to "integrity"). I do not quarrel here with writers who find the principle indeterminate, even
hollow. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 239-44 (1986); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea
of Equality, 95 HARV. L REV. 537, 546-47 (1982). Rather, I presume that some recognition of
entitlements or rights rooted in judgments of equality and inequality is a characteristic of stable
legal systems. See Joshua . Sarnoff Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWAL REV. 377, 382 (1999).
60. George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L REV. 347, 347 (1996) [here-
inafter Fletcher, Domination].
61. Elsewhere in Domination in Wrongdoing, Fletcher flinches from considering the radical
implications of his ideas. The thesis of Domination in Wrongdoing is that contract, tort, and
criminal law occupy points on a continuum of domination. Contract law follows a "failed collabo-
ration" approach whereby the victim is deemed vigorous; for example, she must act to mitigate
the damage attributed to a breached contract. Id. at 356-57. In criminal law, at the other end of
the continuum, the victim has no such duty, by hypothesis she neither can nor should avoid the
wrong. Id. at 356. Fletcher omits the next step, which is that in their outlook on domination,
contract law and criminal law side with the powerful: the party with more assets can breach a
contract without cause or excuse, knowing that the victim will be faulted for a less-than-vigorous
response, while the passive-victim hypothesis of criminal law aids the state in convicting accused
persons of crimes.
62. I use "civil rights" to refer to social movements that seek fuller protection under the law
for groups that they claim suffer systemic invidious discrimination.
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rather than belligerents who provoked conflict randomly, or with a
desire simply to destroy-activists were able to pursue an expanded
vision of social utility. I contrast their successes with other move-
ments of the same era, notably feminism, that have been able to
make only wavering reference to aggression. Successful activists in
the civil rights arena, I argue, must start with reciprocity and then
move to utility. When they cannot evoke something resembling
Fletcher's paradigm of reciprocity, these activists have trouble
reaching utility-that is, a plea to the broader public that their
claim warrants societal approval.
Telling a success story of another kind, the second half of
Part IV recounts the attack on predation in antitrust law. Starting
in the late 1970s, influential scholars and jurists associated with
the University of Chicago contended that because many types of
predatory behavior in business do not in practice conduce to mo-
nopoly power-and indeed can often yield gains to the public-the
law should not try to stop or redress predation, especially predatory
pricing.63 The courts have accepted some of this revisionist view of
predation when siding with defendants. 64
As an event in law reform, the predation battle, like the civil
rights struggle, illuminates how aggression, reciprocity, and utility
are political as well as legal concepts. The political conflicts of anti-
trust predation amount to one query: Can a word virtually synony-
mous with aggression be understood only in utilitarian terms? No, I
argue; reciprocity is too central to variations on aggression like
"predation." The persistence of predation in antitrust doctrine sup-
ports this view. Regardless of whether predation pricing should re-
main actionable-in the end, I take no position-"predation" or
"predatory" has a plain sense of rapacity and plunder. Monopolistic
behavior in restraint of trade can be regulated and redressed with-
out attention to aggression, but predation is intelligible only with
reference to sentiment. Embarrassed by these old-fashioned conno-
tations of feeling, economists continue to insist that predation is a
63. See supra note 8 and sources cited therein. Within antitrust, the "Chicago" label, ac-
cording to one jurist often associated with it, refers to a stance in favor of using price theory as a
principal source of antitrust policy. Richard A- Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979).
64. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-94 (1986) (ex-
pressing skepticism that predatory pricing will ever result in harm); Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809
F.2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir. 1987) (extending Matsushita's reasoning to the Robinson-Patman Act);
Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1055-57 (6th Cir. 1984) (de-
claring that prices above average total cost are never predatory, regardless of the defendant's
intent to eliminate its competition).
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function of something else, like cost pricing; the word maintains its
stubborn connotation of aggression.
Throughout public law, then, from civil rights to regulated
capitalism and beyond, the law defines aggression with reference to
rules of play. The idea of a "game," still working overtime in the law
reviews and other academic periodicals, may serve to summarize
my thesis. In a game, suffering a detriment (or "losing") is accept-
able and accepted, provided the winner has played fair. Perhaps the
most familiar fair-play rule, common to games generally, is the idea
that a player should do "nothing personal" while trying to win. The
law of aggression declares and enforces fair-play rules. What I have
called the recipient's sentiment of aggression-his or her personal
feeling of having been violated-may be expressed in terms of the
voluntariness that characterizes a game: "I didn't consent to this."
Whenever the complaint prevails within a community or society,
this judgment about aggression states a conclusion that the initia-
tor violated the rules of the game. The more "personal" the initia-
tor's actions appear, the more likely they are to be castigated and
sanctioned.65 A contrary judgment overrides the victim's characteri-
zation of the experience-and installs acceptance, a kind of super-
imposed consent.
The existence of a game may be optimal in a Kaldor-Hicks
sense, meaning in everyone's best interest overall, 66 but games
regulated by law are played without universal agreement. This ab-
sence of full consent obliges the law to reflect soberly on the balance
that it has struck between passive and assertive conceptions of
freedom. The obligation is unique to the study of law: More than
other disciplines, law and its mechanisms of enforcement them-
selves continually invade the boundaries of individuals. With its
subpoenas, stays of execution, creditors' remedies, destruction of
contraband, court orders to desegregate, military invasions, im-
peachments, entries of judgment, lethal injections, gavels banging
down, and hundreds of other measures, law and its measures of en-
forcement mediate perpetually between the gains of incursion and
65. See E-mail from Joseph Dodge, Visiting Professor, Florida State University College of
Law, to Anita Bernstein, Visiting Professor, Emory University School of Law (Oct. 11, 1999) (on
file with author) (noting that defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress rely
heavily on the conclusion that certain hurtful actions are wrong because they are personal). In
the preceding paragraph I have followed closely Professor Dodges paraphrase of the thesis of
this Article. See id.; see also E-mail from Joseph Dodge, Visiting Professor, Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law, Visiting Professor, Florida State University College of Law to Anita
Bernstein, Visiting Professor, Emory University School of Law (Oct. 12, 1999) (on file with
author). I elaborate on the game metaphor infra Part ILC.
66. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 14-17 (explaining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
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the universal human wish to be free of unwanted encroachment. All
persons, nations, and institutions can be agents and recipients of
aggression; the law, obliged as it is to regulate the ensuing con-
flicts, needs to develop its own perspective on the phenomenon.
I. THE PARADIGMS OF RECIPROCITY AND UTILITY
The concepts of reciprocity and utility, both of which are in-
tegral to aggression in the law, demand some elaboration, and reci-
procity demands a greater share of this effort because of its relative
obscurity. This Part begins with a brief look at reciprocity in the
philosophy and political theory that underlie current legal thought.
Reciprocity permeates ideals about behavior as well as law. Utility,
I continue, both clarifies and limits the jurisprudential force of
reciprocity.
A. Reciprocity as a Behavioral Ideal and Legal Principle
1. Philosophical Antecedents
Since antiquity, ethicists have described reciprocity as a con-
stituent of ethics. Their teachings present variations on reciprocity
that differ in emphasis but unite around a core of moral equality
among persons. The Sermon on the Mount, for example, cast human
relations as requiring reciprocity in the sense of mutual benevo-
lence; each person, Jesus urged, should treat others as he would
like to be treated, even to the point of embracing enemies with
love.67 Greek and Roman writers addressed reciprocity in terms of
exchange-give what you get and get what you give. 68 Challenged
by a heckler to state Judaic law while standing on one foot, the sage
Hillel declared: "That which is hateful unto thee do not do unto thy
neighbor. The rest is commentary. Now go and study."69 A similar
norm of reciprocity is attributed to Confucius: "What you do not
want done to yourself, do not do to others."70
67. Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31.
68. See John Topel, The Tarnished Golden Rule (Luke 6:31): The Inescapable Radicalness of
Christian Ethics, 59 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 475, 482 (1998) (quoting Xenophon, "[tio pay a debt of
gratitude, try to be to him what he has been to you," and Seneca, "[e]xpect from another what
you have done to another").
69. Sheldon F. Gottlieb, Why I Am a Humanist Skeptic-And Still a Jew, FREE INQUIRY,
Fall 1993, at 29.
70. See Topel, supra note 68, at 482-84.
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Reciprocity is integral also to distinctions found in Aristote-
lian conceptions of justice, notably the distinction between distribu-
tive and corrective justice.71 Distributive justice, to Aristotle, re-
gards proportionality as alien to reciprocity: X is not necessarily
obliged to render unto Y the equivalent of what Y renders unto X.72
Corrective justice, however, seeks to nullify the gains and losses
occasioned by episodes of wrongful encroachment. 73 Thus distribu-
tive justice eschews reciprocity while corrective justice extols it. 74
The reference to transactions links corrective justice with another
Aristotelian ideal, obligations between parties to an exchange; Aris-
totle used the word reciprocity to describe them.7
2. The Philosophy of Reciprocity Meets Jurisprudence
Whereas the ancients situated reciprocity in justice and even
perhaps in law, contemporary understandings of reciprocity in law
supply the context of a familiar legal system. The writings of Im-
manuel Kant, which connect philosophy to legal principle generally,
situate reciprocity in a modern, law-like framework. Kant writes
that persons are situated in relation to one another, and the rela-
tion endows them with duties and freedoms that resemble the rules,
penalties, principles, and entitlements of law.76 According to Kant,
individual liberty means freedom from forcible external actions that
prohibit a person from engaging in activities, provided that these
activities do not themselves forcibly hamper the freedom of other
persons. 77 All consensual interactions are just; put another way, one
cannot commit an injustice against oneself.78
71. See A.T. Nuyen, Just Modesty, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 101, 104 (1998) (noting that Greek word
for justice, dike, implies quantitative measurements resembling checks and balances). Aristotle
believed that reciprocity was essential to friendship as well as justice. Topel, supra note 68, at
483 n.38 (noting Aristotle's view that reciprocity is a constituent of friendship).
72. See Shridath Ramphal, Beyond Mere Surviual, EPA J., Apr.-June 1993, at 10, 12 (in-
voking Aristotle to defend proposal of unequal sacrifices among industrial and developing na-
tions).
73. See Fletcher, Domination, supra note 60, at 352-60.
74. But see RIPSTEIN, supra note 49, at 267 (relating reciprocity to distributive justice).
75. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 1132b, lines 24-26. Although scholars dispute whether
Aristotle's reference to reciprocity is a subset of corrective justice or alternatively an independent
precept, it is unquestionably prominent in Aristotelian justice. Jason W. Neyers, The Inconsis-
tencies of Aristotle's Theory of Corrective Justice, 11 CAN. J.L & JURISPRUDENCE 311, 319 (1998).
76. See ROGER J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S ETHICS 49-51 (1994).
77. See IMIANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEM ENTS OF JUSTICE 231 (John Ladd trans.,
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797). Similarly, it is unjust to deceive another person in a way
that threatens her life or property. See id. at 238 & n.9.
78. See ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-18 (1993) (summarizing "Kant's
Principle of Civil Freedom").
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These tenets of justice presume, as does reciprocity gener-
ally, that human beings are both like and unlike one another. Per-
sons are alike in their innate conception of human equality. Their
distinctly human trait of reason situates them on a level plane.79
Reason enables each person to make choices among alternative
courses of conduct and to identify fellow human beings as agents
with the same capacity. This understanding allows the individual to
perceive the wrongfulness of force and fraud in transactions or en-
counters, and the wrongfulness of tyrannous compulsion in
society.8 0
At the same time, however, human beings differ from one
another, at least in the sense that each individual has a unique ob-
ligation to use her own facility of reason in order to perceive her
unshared, one-of-a-kind endeavors and political commitments.81 As
many writers read him, Kant went further in his conception of di-
vergence among human beings. Friedrich Hayek, for example, has
extended Kant to maintain that because societies cannot identify
their best "common ends," individuals must be free to answer their
own questions about value.8 2 Robert Nozick, also invoking Kant,
extrapolates from human uniqueness the principle that the freedom
to act without constraint is always desirable, apart from the uses
human beings make of this freedom. 88 Regardless of whether mod-
ern libertarianism follows from Kant's conception of the individual,
however, at a minimum this conception dictates a duty of ethical
struggle and reflection-which no community, legislature, or sover-
eign can undertake on behalf of any person. At least in the sense of
individual duties, human beings are all different from one another.
The rigors of reciprocity demand that persons understand both dis-
tinctions and common ground between themselves and others.
The work of John Rawls makes clearer Kant's treatment of
reciprocity as a source of universal duties and freedoms and of a
conception of equality that can withstand many of the hard ques-
79. The human monopoly on reason is claimed in IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal
History with Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL
KANT'S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 116, 118-19 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. & trans., 1949).
80. See HOWARD WILLIAMS, KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 198 (1983) (distinguishing the
ability to discern and condemn tyranny, which Kant celebrates, from the right to engage in
revolutionary violence, which Kant rejects).
81. Allen Rosen takes this relatively parsimonious view of the range of human behaviors
that Kantian liberty commands. ROSEN, supra note 78, at 58-62.
82. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 59-60 (1944).
83. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33-34 (1974) (noting that human
beings perceive their own lives as unique, and naturally object to command and conscription).
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tions applied to that term. "Those who can give justice are owed
justice," Rawls writes,84 deeming this commutative relationship a
"basis of equality."8 5 The "veil of ignorance," made famous in A The-
ory of Justice, describes in Kantian metaphor the obligation to re-
gard fellow persons as both like and unlike oneself.86 Greatly es-
teemed by legal scholars, A Theory of Justice has begotten a genera-
tion of legal commentaries and prescriptions; dozens of judges have
invoked the book in an array of reported decisions.8 7
Starting with the Kantian belief that persons are endowed
with liberties consistent with a like degree of liberty for all, Rawls
proposes that this principle of social freedom answers questions of
substance as well as procedural justice, and tells a society how re-
curring disputes ought to be perceived and resolved. Gregory
Keating has continued this argument, showing by analysis of clas-
sic torts cases that fairly precise rules, or what Keating calls "sub-
ordinate doctrines," derive from Kant and Rawls.88 Commenting on
reciprocity, Keating declares unhesitatingly that "mutual freedom7
informs the content of accident law (and, he implies, all of law be-
yond accidents):
Reciprocal risks are risks that are equal in magnitude, equal in probability, and
imposed for reasons that are both good enough to justify the perils they risk and
equally good. Risk impositions that meet these criteria are fair because they are,
ex ante, to the long run advantage of those they imperil.P
This application of reciprocity, though associated with social con-
tract theory expounded in the 1970s, has an earlier pedigree, to
which we now turn.
84. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 510 (1971).
85. Id. at 504.
86. Behind Rawls's veil of ignorance each man does not know
his place in society, his class position or social status . . . his fortune in the dis-
tribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the
like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars
of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as
his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism.
Id. at 137; see also Edward B. Foley, Jurisprudence and Theology, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1195,
1199 (1998) (revising Rawls slightly to build a "principle of reciprocity" that invites citizens to
imagine trading places with one another while not ignorant of personal circumstances).
87. A search of the Mega libraryMega file of Lexis in November 6, 2000 counted 44 cita-
tions of A Theory of Justice in jadicial opinions.
88. Gregory C. Keating, Fairness and Two Fundamental Questions in the Tort Law of Acci-
dents 66-68 (Sept. 24, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
89. Id. at 72.
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3. Reciprocity in Accident Law: Cases and Commentary Before
Fairness and Utility
As we approach George Fletcher's contention that liability
depends less on allocative efficiency than on relationships-either
between injurers and victims or among the members of a commu-
nity of risk takers,"° the torts precedents for his view warrant no-
tice. Reciprocity achieved explicit recognition in the English nui-
sance case of Bamford v. Turnley.91 In Bamford the plaintiff ob-
jected to the smells and sounds generated by the defendant's brick-
making business. 92 Ruling for the defendant, Baron Bramwell called
the intrusion "common and ordinary," too minor to be actionable;
Bramwell explained that "reciprocal nuisances are of a compara-
tively trifling character. The convenience of such a rule may be in-
dicated by calling it a rule of give and take, live and let live."93 Al-
though some prefer to describe the Bamford holding as a de mini-
mis exception to nuisance law,94 Bramwell's phrase casts its trivi-
ality rationale as subordinate to reciprocity.95
Whereas Bamford's treatment of reciprocity permits an allo-
cative-efficiency gloss on the outcome-the plaintiffs injury was too
cheap to take seriously, one might say-another important precur-
sor to Fairness and Utility allows no such reading, situating itself
firmly in a paradigm of reciprocity to the exclusion of utility. In
Aircraft Operator's Liability for Ground Damage and Passenger
Injury, a 1935 article not cited by. Fletcher, Professor Lawrence
Vold of the University of Nebraska College of Law and two second-
year students agreed that "one-sidedness of the risk of the activity"
justifies strict liability.96 The authors deemed "mutuality of risk" a
proper basis for the kinder-to-defendants negligence rule, and con-
cluded that the aviation industry did not deserve such doctrinal
90. See COLEMAN, supra note 34, at 255.
91. Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1862).
92 Id. at 32-33.
93. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts repeats the last seven words of this phrase with
approval. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g (1977).
94. See, e.g., Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Pollution Trading Permits as a Form of
Market Socialism and the Search for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 51, 61-62 (1994).
95. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369,
1402 (1994) (stating that Bamford holds that "each person is compensated for the harm inflicted
by the like power to inflict harms on others").
96. Lawrence Vold et al., Aircraft Operator's Liability for Ground Damage and Passenger
Injury, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 373, 380 (1935).
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favor.9 7 Published at the height of the Depression (with no wartime
procurement money in sight), and aware of the vulnerability of the
youthful industry it was addressing, Aircraft Operator's Liability is
noteworthy for its cool treatment of an enterprise that wanted judi-
cial indulgence, if not subsidy.98 The authors barely support their
assertion that the aviation industry can internalize the costs of its
accidents, and in general make no efficiency arguments when
deeming ground damage a betrayal of reciprocity:
ETihe benefit of the activity accrues directly to the aviator and to him only. The
aeronaut flies over the land of the ground owner without the permission of the lat-
ter. He is not in the position of the railroad which may have paid adjoining land-
owners an exorbitant price for the use of the right of way. He is not in the position
of the motorist who uses the road constructed for the benefit of the property owner
as well as the motorist and which adds materially to the value of the adjoining
property... As between those who benefit from aeronautics and those who do not,
who should pay the bills of the industry. 9
Both Bamford and Aircraft Operator's Liability support the
proposition that imbalances between the circumstances of a plain-
tiff and a defendant justify doctrinal distinctions. At this point,
having reviewed reciprocity as a philosophical concept, its connec-
tion to jurisprudence, and themes of reciprocity in tort case law and
commentary, we may move to the work that brings these three pre-
ceding elements together.
4. Fletcher's Paradigm of Reciprocity
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory occupies a peculiar place
in the torts canon. One scholar sees it as an oddly barren ancestral
figure, venerated yet without "offspring"; efficiency analysis, its
competitor, has by contrast been fruitful and multiplied.10 Another
critic has paid Fairness and Utility the strange tribute of steady
attacks for more than twenty years. 101 Other disagreements are
97. Id. at 380-82. Deftly, Vold, West, and Wolf burden the aviation industry with an earlier
stance it had taken: the industry had claimed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply
to airplane crashes because such an occurrence is not unusual enough to bespeak negligence.
Too bad, the authors write. "Either the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to flying or else flying
is extra-hazardous." Id. at 380 n.19.
98. Id. at 384 (scoffing at "what has been euphemistically termed a young and growing in-
dustry which should be relieved of the burdens of paying its bills").
99. Id. at 382.
100. See Keating, supra note 46, at 313-14.
101. See COLEMAN, supra note 34, at 253-69; Jules L. Coleman, Correctitv Justice and
Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 432-36 (1982); Jules L. Coleman, Justice and Reciprocity
in Tort Theory, 14 IV. ONT. L REV. 105, 106-15 (1975); Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Prac-
tice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2610 (1995).
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continually published.10 2 If Fletcher is right, why are there so many
attacks? If Fletcher is wrong, why do so many scholars hold Fair-
ness and Utility in such high esteem?
The explanation, I believe, lies in the tendency of torts
scholars to sort the world of accident law into two camps, in rough
terms Kantianism and utilitarianism; writers identify themselves
in favor of one and against the other. Fairness and Utility was an
early player in this game: By the early 1970s some philosophy-of-
torts scholars, Fletcher included, had seen the future, and to their
dismay it looked like law and economics. 10 3 The stance seems to af-
front both sides. One set of objections to Fletcher says that reci-
procity does not comport with tort rules, while another says that it
is utility that fails, at both normative and descriptive levels.104
This quarrel misses the enduring insight of the article,
which is that philosophical division between fairness and utility (or
Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism, or Fletcher's "reciprocity"
and "reasonableness," or, as a recent article would have it, fairness
and welfare economics'0 5) illuminates case outcomes and patterns of
doctrine in the law of accidents. Dialectic between two elements,
rather than one dominating paradigm, is the point. Thus, rather
than compete in a doctrinal or philosophical boxing-ring where only
one can triumph, as some implicitly contend, fairness and utility fit
together in a working relationship. Moreover, torts scholars who
point out that either the reciprocity or the utility paradigm com-
102. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 672 (6th ed. 1995)
(faulting Fletcher's paradigms for not answering many questions of how cases ought to come
out); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 338 (1999) (differing with Fletcher on the question of whether
"deviation from the accepted balance" of risks justifies different doctrinal treatment); Keating,
supra note 46, at 313-14; Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive Model of
the Development of Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (1990) (suggesting that Fletcher
overstates the normative appeal of reciprocity); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and
the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 985-86 (1981) (critiquing Fletcher for indeter-
minacy of the paradigms).
103. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at 572-73.
104. Compare Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV.
977, 1007 (1996) (noting that the paradigm of reciprocity conflicts with the law of defamation,
medical malpractice, employer liability to employees, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress), with Richard W. Wright, Principled Adjudication: Tort Law and Beyond, 7
CANTERBURY L. REV. 265, 280-81, 286-89 (1999) (noting "unreasonable" or anti-utilitarian
stances of tort law, including consent doctrine and the distinction between intentional and acci-
dental harm). One author has attempted to bridge the gap between fairness and utility priorities
in tort law. William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in
New York, 1920-1980, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 117, 225-26 (1999) (arguing that efficiency concerns
influence beliefs about what is fair).
105. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare Economics in Normative
Analysis of Law (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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mends outcomes that are contrary to actual tort rules demonstrate
collectively that most tort rules also comport with one of the twvo
paradigms.
Furthermore, if tort law partakes of both fairness and util-
ity, then one may surmise that other areas of the law are influenced
by the same two sources. Internecine partisanship in one subject
should not continue to obscure the value of an important commen-
tary on all of American law: it is ironic and unfortunate that Fair-
ness and Utility, despite Fletcher's renown as a scholar of criminal
law and comparative law, seems to have found readers (or at any
rate citations) almost exclusively in torts. Although the acclaim for
Fairness and Utility in the torts literature gives Fletcher credit for
illustrating the relation between Kantian ethics and utilitarianism
in torts, a wider audience-less confined to poles of a dichotomy-
would extend this recognition into all of legal doctrine. 10
My survey thus far has suggested that doctrine and scholar-
ship in torts sketch a division between condoned and condemned
encounters. As Fletcher puts the point, all persons are subject to
harm from "background risks," and are not entitled to compensation
for resultant injuries; but "no one may suffer harm from additional
risks without recourse for damages against the risk creator."07 Re-
gardless of whether Fletcher's recitation of tort rules in Fairness
and Utility is doctrinally correct,108 his choice of subject matter is
inspired. How legal systems regard the harms occasioned by per-
sons butting up against one another in society reveals their concep-
tion of the law of human relationships. Persons are expected to "live
and let live" in society, as Baron Bramwell would say, and tolerate
many incursions; of all the accounts of human collisions experi-
enced in the United States, few reach the courts. This condoned-
condemned division rests on a concept of reciprocity.
Reciprocity is not a complete paradigm-neither for acci-
dents, nor aggression, nor any other category of encounters between
human beings. Instead it presents a partial account of society and
community, emphasizing what human beings do to and for one an-
other. This account does not ignore concerns of efficiency or welfare,
106. John Goldberg describes a related endeavor for Goldberg, the private law of wrongs il-
luminates the law of rights, notwithstanding the contentions of activists since the 19703 that
rights are progressive or egalitarian, and that tort law (or the law of wrongs) is hostile to this
progress. John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1828, 1830-31 (1999).
107. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at 550.
108. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting criticisms). Fletcher concedes the
validity of some of this critique in Fletcher, Domination, supra note 60, at 347-48.
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but rather emphasizes its concerns about freedom and intrusion. 0 9
It pays little heed to fault, a concept often understood in terms of
allocative efficiency. 110 It neglects incentives, market solutions,
market failures, and general deterrence. We turn now to some of
these countervailing concerns, which are associated with "utility."
B. Utility Moderates Reciprocity
The society envisioned in an absolutist version of the para-
digm of reciprocity-one with zero tolerance for unwelcome en-
croachment-would fail utterly to provide its members with a level
of welfare otherwise attainable from its resources.1 It would grind
to the proverbial halt. 12 In recognition of this fact, law mediates
between the paradigms of reciprocity and utility.
No canonical definition of utilitarianism being available, we
may think of it for present purposes simply as consequentialism: a
doctrine that "the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined
by the goodness or badness of their consequences."1 3 Beginning
with Jeremy Bentham, legal thought has found utilitarianism con-
genial: As one philosopher puts it, utilitarianism is "the test of legal
institutions, so that a legal system will be adjudged desirable if it
will produce (or probably produce) maximal happiness." 114 As the
better-known of Fletcher's two paradigms, "utility" is so fixed in
American jurisprudence as to require little elaboration here. What
may demand a few words is my contention that in its treatment of
aggression, American law begins-and should begin-with the first
paradigm. This ordinal decision is not a claim that reciprocity is
109. In his analysis of Bamford, Gregory Keating distinguishes between reciprocity of risk,
which holds little interest for him, and reciprocity of harm. Keating, supra note 88, at 15-16. For
Keating nuisance and negligence are critically different. Nuisance amounts to a buzz, a chronic
inconvenience that does not always reach the heights of "substantial"; the types of injuries romo-
died by negligence law tend to be severe. Id. at 15. 'Live and let live," to Keating, means that
we must live with "risk whose reduction is not consistent with the flourishing of valuable activi-
ties; it is the price of freedom to act." Id. at 16.
110. Jules Coleman discusses this "surprising conclusion" in COLEMAN, supra note 34, at 229,
111. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 105, at 12 (adverting to absurdity of paying infinite
sums to redress small-stakes "fairness" claims).
112. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
113. J.J.C. Smart, Utilitarianism, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 206 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967). But see WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 89-90 (objecting that the distinction botween
utilitarianism and consequentialism is significant).
114. RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 197 (1992); cf. Hardin,
supra note 27, at 1792 C'To argue coherently, legal philosophers must be institutionalist.").
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more important than utility, but rather an attempt to be faithful to
the premises of each paradigm.
In making happiness the reason for an act, or a rule, or a so-
cial system,11 5 utilitarianism presumes that human feelings precede
choices-about which action to take, which rule to write, what insti-
tution to create. 116 For purposes of thinking about aggression in the
law, accordingly, the struggle over happiness between aggression
and target-is A entitled to operate her noisome factory, or is B en-
titled to the unimpeded enjoyment of his nearby house?" 7-must be
considered before the utility of an act or rule about the factory will
emerge. I do not deny that utilitarianism can precede, and also in-
fluence, the creation of tastes and inclinations that affect the sum
of human happiness." 8 At the level of act-category, however, a legal
system must know the preexisting stakes for human happiness be-
fore it can decide whether to condone or condemn.
A related sense in which reciprocity precedes utility, even
more pertinent to the creation and understanding of legal rules and
principles, lies in the emergence of welfare from the aggregation of
individual wants, one person at a time. Any legal conception of ag-
gression must begin with the small unit-one act, one category of
behavior, one legal rule-before contemplating the optimal balance
between freedom to aggress and freedom from aggression. Rawls
points out that the "most natural way" to implement utilitarianism
is to adopt for all of society the principle of rational choice for one
individual." 9 This implementation does pose difficulties-as Rawls
puts it tersely, it "does not take seriously the distinction between
persons"120 -but these difficulties are inherent in utilitarianism
itself rather than in the technique of beginning with one person and
moving to all of society.
Within human cognition, moreover, the concept of intrusion
or violation develops earlier than the subtler notions of waste, lost
opportunity, deterioration, and other variations on reduced
utility.12 1 The sequence of reciprocity first, utility second, thus fol-
115. See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 8-11 (7th ed. 1907).
116. See JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (1780) (adverting to
"happiness").
117. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
118. See BRANDT, supra note 114, at 203-04 (suggesting that a utilitarian would favor edu-
cating children to find certain behaviors "aversive" and to encourage the development of con-
science).
119. RAWLS, supra note 84, at 26-27.
120. John Rawls, Classical Utilitarianism, in CONSEQUENTIALIS2,. AND ITS CRITICS 14, 19
(Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
121. I elaborate at infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
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lows the same cognitive stance that treats affirmative misfeasance
as worse than failures to act, even when the consequences of omis-
sion are equally dire. 122 Philosopher Bernard Williams faults utili-
tarianism for concerning itself with "the state of affairs," a concern
Williams thinks is simply contrary to the human inclination to care
more about direct actions than about general conditions including
omissions. 12 Although sentient adults recognize that omissions,
states of affairs, and rejected alternatives contain moral signifi-
cance, this recognition comes to them only after they understand
the immediacy of contact. For this reason utility moderates reci-
procity, rather than the reverse.
In a system of legal control, this moderation occurs by means
of a decision to condone most of those encroachments that conduce
to overall welfare. The apparent paradox of encroachment and wel-
fare-whereby American law both celebrates entrepreneurial intru-
sion yet asserts a right to be let alone124-becomes intelligible upon
recognition of both reciprocity and utility. Tort law is not internally
inconsistent for rendering this recognition, and, as we shall see, 126
other doctrines also partake of the Fletcher division: They start
with "solely ... the claims and interests of the parties before the
court," and then seek "a way that serves the interests of the com-
munity as a whole."'126
The fault rule-which establishes blameworthy conduct as a
prerequisite to liability-illustrates this function of utility moder-
ating reciprocity. Following Learned Hand, tort law equates fault
with squandering: It is wasteful, and therefore blameworthy, to
leave a barge unattended during daylight hours in the heavy war-
time traffic of New York harbor because the expected costs of in-
jury, or what Hand called PL, are greater than the costs of precau-
tion, or B.127 Comparing the two sides of this algebraic variable be-
122. One philosopher claims plausibly that most people agree with her statement that "kill.
ing is surely worse than letting die." Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J.
1395, 1396 (1985). In English legal history, the writ for trespass came before the "case" writ; the
latter provided for trespass liability based on indirect application of force, suggesting that the
English legal system evinced its maturity with this more sophisticated recognition of responsi-
bility for harm. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 73-75 (3d ed. 1990).
123. Bernard Williams, Consequentialism and Integrity, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS
CRITICS, supra note 120, at 20, 31
124. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
125. See infra Part III.
126. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at 540.
127. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Nelson,
supra note 104, at 175-78 (noting earlier, less famous judicial opinions by Learned Hand that
discuss negligence in terms of utility).
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gins with something like a reciprocity analysis. The fault rule in-
vites the actor to contemplate the cost of his action and inaction-
what it would be like to get your boat hit, how burdensome it is for
me to incur precaution costs. Here I do not mean to site homo
economicus in the "fairness" camp, only to say that moral and legal
conclusions about utility work in partnership with such conclusions
about reciprocity.1i Requiring the plaintiff to prove fault does not
begin with waste, but rather adds a criterion of disutility to the
sense of wrongful encroachment that precedes it.
The utility-moderates-reciprocity sequencing inverts the
standard inclination of a legal system to begin with institutions and
allocative concerns. 129 Although it may seem more orderly to start
with macro-level policy-making, protests about aggression start in-
stead at the level of human collisions, and thus the law of aggres-
sion always begins at the same point. The legislative and executive
branches of government continue to make utilitarianism an oper-
ating principle' 30-and the judiciary often does the same; much of
adjudication aspires to guide the future, as well as depict and re-
solve conflicts of the past.'3 ' Yet affronts to reciprocity are neces-
sary before the law of aggression can contemplate an outcome that
maximizes social welfare. 132
II. WHAT IS AGGRESSION?
Those who seek to write new definitions of familiar term
generally begin by consulting existing definitions, and statements
about the nature of aggression certainly abound. Few of these defi-
nitions, however, comport with the central task of legal policy-
128. Cf. Heidi 1VL Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 251-52 (1996)
(arguing that despite its emphasis on consequences, the Hand formula is congruent with rights-
based or Kantian analysis as well as utilitarianism).
129. As Bernard Williams point out, utilitarianism appeals to architects of a legal system be-
cause utilitarianism regards questions about the good as empirical, "a matter of social science.
WILLIams, supra note 43, at 92. This analytic stance makes good use of existing institutions and
suggests the possibility of measurement valuable to the politically accountable.
130. See BRANDT, supra note 114, at 239.
131. Oliver Wendell Holmes is noted for his conception ofjudge-made law as forward.looking.
In The Path of the Law, Holmes urged judges to consider "competing legislative grounds" before
favoring one outcome over another, and wrote that they have a duty to weigh costs and benefits
to determine "social advantage." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 460,
471 (1897).
132. Cf Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. REV. 507, 513, 522 (1984) (ar-
guing that the law of harassment and stalking must meet the safety needs of the victim foremost
and the treatment needs of stalker secondarily, rather than continue its emphasis on criminal
prohibitions that "range from slightly to grossly inadequate").
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makers: to present a defensible structure of state-sponsored coer-
cion. 38 For purposes of defining aggression in the law, we defini-
tion-writers should not condemn an encroachment unless it merits
systemic disapproval. Moreover, we should like to avoid hypocrisy:
Because law must intrude, and compel, and insert itself unbidden
into human lives, definitions of aggression that prevail in other dis-
ciplines are too broad for law when they condemn intrusion, com-
pulsion, or insertion per se. Here we endeavor to find those behav-
iors that are harmful enough-that is, encroaching enough-to
warrant the powerful and expensive suppressants of the state.
A. Culling Among the Social Sciences and Humanities
Criminology, theology, anthropology, and various schools of
psychology have taken on the task of preparing, testing, and ex-
plaining rival definitions of aggression. Such contributions, though
invaluable to the definitional task, can be both too narrow and too
broad for law. Definitions of aggression are too narrow when they
demand to see physical blows (for instance, the law happens to take
an interest in aggression on paper, and aggression that taints
agreements 13 4) and they can be too broad because of their wider
swath: For example, animal behavior and biological bases of ag-
gression do not concern the law. Theological contributions can fit
better in those respects, but they aspire to different ends, and begin
with different understandings of their own competence to define.
Consider some points of departure from the social sciences and the-
ology.
1. Aggression as Originating Within the Aggressor
One strong tradition in psychology-following Freud, per-
haps-deems aggression to begin in the person whose behaviors are
under its scrutiny. Freud wrote often about aggression as
"instinct,"'1 5 sending followers and successors scrambling to locate
the origin of the impulse to aggress. Thus aggression is said to start
133. See DWORKIN, supra note 59, passim. I elaborate on the centrality of state-sponsored
coercion in Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations From Obscenity,
Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 CAL. L. REV. 305, 310-12 (1999).
134. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
135. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 86 (1930); LARSEN, supra note
1, at 41-47 (summarizing Freudian and neo-Freudian views on aggression).
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in the half-purposeful mutations of biology, 136 or in the Darwinian
notion that organisms must compete in order to survive. 137 From
there one may gradually relax the search for a direct, independent
physiological basis,138 and speculate that aggression starts with pa-
rental rejection, perhaps. 139 In trauma, sometimes. 140 In sex hor-
mones, of course. 141
This search for origins and antecedents that operate on the
person of the aggressor extends beyond anatomy and physiology.
One famous work, completed at Yale during the Depression, identi-
fied "frustration" as the source of aggression; 1' with a confidence
seldom seen in contemporary social science, the authors contended
that aggressive behavior always indicates the presence of frustra-
tion, and frustration, in turn, always leads to aggressive
behavior.'4 Psychologists continue the search for root causes, 1'
while critics within psychology condemn the search for antecedents
of aggression as ill-conceived. 145
136. See generally, eg., ERICH FROMM, THE ANATOMY OF HUMATN DESTRUcTIVENESS (1973)
(dichotomizing between adaptive and "malignant" biologies of aggression).
137. See MONTAGU, supra note 42, at 38-39 (describing this view as a vulgar misreading of
Darwin).
138. See John Burton, The Nature of Aggression as Revealed in the Atomic Age, in THE
NATURAL HISTORY OF AGGRESSION 145, 147 (J.D. Carthy & F.J. Ebling eds., 1964) (contending
that no such physiological basis exists).
139. See generally KAREN HoRNEY, OUR INNER CONFLICTS (1945).
140. See Leonard Berkowitz, On the Formation and Regulation of Anger and Aggression: A
Cognitive-Neoassociationistic Analysis, 45 AhL PSYCHOLOGIST 495, 498 (1990).
141. A good treatment appears in John Archer, The Influence of Testosterone on Human Ag-
gression, 82 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL 1, 3 (1991). See generally KATHLEEN J. GREIDER, RECKONING
WITH AGGRESSION: THEOLOGY, VIOLENCE, AND VITALITY 25-26 (1997) (citing ELEANOR E.
MACCOBY & CAROL N. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 243.46 (1974)). As Grei-
der points out, researchers who study sex hormones as sources of aggression find much more
than the "testosterone poisoning" notion beloved in popular culture: deficiencies as well as ex-
cesses in testosterone contribute to aggressive behaviors, and estrogen too can be a source of
aggression. GREIDER, supra, at 25. See generally NATALIE ANGIER, W OAN: AN INTIMATE
GEOGRAPHY 243-57 (1999) (summarizing works that describe the uncertain causal relation be-
tween hormones and aggression).
142. DOLLARD, supra note 58, at 1.
143. See id. at 1-2.
144. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARON & DEBORAH R. RICHARDSON, HU1,IAN AGGRESSION 26-28 (2d
ed. 1994) (summarizing work of Leonard Berkowitz about "aversive stimuli" that meet "aggres-
sive cues"); ARNOLD L BUSS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGGRESSION 17-32 (1961) (describing "noxious
stimuli").
145. See BARON & RICHARDSON, supra note 144, at 20; GREIDER, supra note 141, at 26 (com-
plaining that "some of these methods seek to study the body extrapolated from its environment
and thus study an artificial body, not the profound mutual interaction of biology, relationship
and culture that together give form to actual human embodiment'). See generally J.T. TedEschi
et at, A Reinterpretation of Research on Aggression, 81 PSYCH. BULL 540 (1974) (contending that
aggression is a conclusion indicating little more than the disapproval of the observer).
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Sound or not, the attempt to originate aggression in either
the body or experience of an individual cannot contribute much to
the account of aggression in law. As far as law is concerned, social
evils originate wherever they can respond to the force of deterrence
and redress. Hence legal causes, for instance, must be "proximate"
rather than ultimate: The carelessness or malfeasance of a wrong-
doer and its effects, not the courtship of her grandparents, becomes
the basis of civil or criminal liability, even if the tort or crime would
never have happened but for the courtship. 146 Tort law divides re-
sponsibility for accidents between "negligence" and "strict liability,"
revealing-at least to economic analysts-its limited interest in the
origins of accidents beyond its initial query: "For this activity,
which strategy would be better to reduce risks-reduction in the
activity level (which commends strict liability) or increased care
(which commends negligence)?"'147
Taking a similar approach to behavioral origins, criminal
law pays little heed to excuses grounded in determinism. "I'm de-
praved on accounta I'm deprived!" wailed Stephen Sondheim's juve-
nile delinquent in West Side Story, 148 but he was joking: Despite
what the public may think, few defendants successfully ascribe
their crimes to Twinkies, or "black rage," or parental neglect, or
premenstrual syndrome. 149 In the battle between psychology and
sociology over whether pathologies originate in the individual or
society, law tends to side with the latter, out of pragmatism rather
than principle. Responsibility, as far as law knows or cares, must
begin and end where the community or government can call it into
effect. Legal policy-makers do not especially want to know the root
146. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 284-85 (9th ed. 1994) (citing
sources, including the 1630 Maxims of Francis Bacon); William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in
California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369, 375 (1950) (worrying about "infinite liability").
147. See RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 476-78 (1982).
148. The song line comes from Gee, Officer Krupke, in LEONARD BERNSTEIN ET AL., WEST
SIDE STORY 116 (1956) (lyrics by Stephen Sondheirn).
149. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 18-19 (1994) (enumerating 40 syndromes
and conditions that have been suggested as excuses for crime). The Abuse Excuse proclaims in
its first sentence that "[tihe abuse excuse-the legal tactic by which criminal defendants claim a
history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation-is quickly becoming a license to kill and
maim." Id. at 3. Two paragraphs later, Professor Dershowitz retreats: only a "few" defendants
raise such claims. Id. at 4. "But at a deeper level," it is all terribly disturbing. Id. Half the book
has nothing to do with abuse excuses; Dershowitz simply reprints old essays on his favorite cru-
sades. E.g., id. at 217-20 (protesting the long prison sentence of Jonathan Pollard); id. at 243.
314 (attacking feminists and various feminist causes, none of them pertaining to "the abuse
excuse"). At the end of the book, Dershowitz provides a glossary of abuse excuses, which con-
cedes that almost none of them has ever succeeded in the courts, not even once. Id. at 321-41.
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causes of aggression; their focus is on the point where aggression
will respond to cues from the state.
2. "Violence" and "Harm"
Many social scientists take a professional interest in visible
disorder. It is often analytically convenient to assume that violence
or harm is the unproblematic concept, the fixed condition, and then
to experiment with hypotheses about causes or preventatives. Some
definitions of aggression reflect this ordering. "Aggression is any
form of behavior directed toward the goal of harassing or injuring
another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment,"
claims a psychology textbook. 50 Like harm, "violence" is often in-
voked in defining aggression. 51
In law's lexicon, however, "violence" and "harm" are as much
conclusions about the effects of behavior as they are strict defining
criteria. Writers outside law agree. Kathleen Greider, for example,
sees no reason to exclude from "violence" behaviors such as "psy-
chospiritual maltreatment"'52 and "microaggressions"; 15 3 she also
includes social conditions like "economic violence,"154 and quotes one
theologian's definition with approval: "[V]iolence is the destruction
of well-being."15 5 These sweeping understandings of "violence" are
not restricted by legal meanings of the word, and even enjoy some
support in the law. 156
150. BARON & RICHARDSON, supra note 144, at 7; see also J.D. Carthy & F.J. Ebling, Preface
and Epilogue, in THE NATURAL HISTORY OF AGGRESSION, supra note 138, at 3 (An organism "acts
aggressively when it inflicts, attempts to inflict, or threatens to inflict damage on another ani-
mal").
151. See GAY, supra note 29, at 532-36 (surveying psychoanalytic themes of aggression that
emphasize destructiveness); see also ROLLO MAY, POWER AND INNOCENCE. A SEARCH FOR THE
SOURCES OF VIOLENCE passim (1972); cf. Carl Iver Hovland & Robert R. Sears, Minor Studies of
Aggression. Correlation ofLynchings with Economic Indices, 9 J. PSYCH. 301, 310 (1940) (linking,
in a study of aggression, lynchings of African-Americans with drops in the price of cotton).
152. GREIDER, supra note 141, at 62.
153. An example of a microaggression is giving preference to a white customer in a store over
a black one. Id.
154. Greider writes that "[w]hite aggressiveness in the marketplace greedily eats up more
than a fair share of profit," supporting this assertion with 1993 Census statistics to the effect
that "the median net worth of whites was $45,740, of blacks, $4,418." Id. at 89.
155. Id. at 9 (quoting MARJORIE HEWvITr SUCHOCKI, THE FALL TO VIOLENCE: ORIGINAL SIN IN
RELATIONAL THEOLOGY 85 (1994)).
156. Not much in American statutes, admittedly, but foreign law and commentary by legal
scholars embrace the concept. The European Parliament has promulgated a resolution de-
nouncing violence against women, using "violence" to cover a wide range of harms. 1986 O.J.
(C176) 73-83; see also WILLIA, IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL
DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE 60-65 (1993) (suggesting that violence equals "boundary.breaking;
Elizabeth Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title Vi
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By contrast "harm" is a legal term with more specific con-
tent, but even harm (also known as "damages," "clear and present
danger," "irreparable injury," and so on) covers much more terrain
in law than in most psychology labs. Protected interests that the
law will honor include economic holdings, emotional tranquility,
artistic integrity, and the exercise of numerous rights: to travel, to
terminate a pregnancy, to worship, to confront accusing witnesses,
to choose one's associates, to gain access to public accommodations,
and many more. 157 Accordingly, it becomes impossible to speak in
the vocabulary of legal rules about the infliction of "harm" or "vio-
lence" until one knows the context and the stakes; these terms too
are variables.
3. The Element of Emotion
Pastoral psychologist David Augsberger describes aggression
as "loveless power,"158 offering legal emulators the shortest defini-
tion available in the literature but covering too many behaviors
that the law would not wish to condemn. For good reasons, the law
is generally indifferent to the presence or absence of love. 15 9 The
law requires individuals to support their spouses and children, even
if a spouse or child means nothing to the individual. 160 It generally
denies a tort cause of action to relatives or intimate friends of
physically injured persons who suffer severe emotional distress as a
and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 395, 396 n.9 (1993) (claiming that "structural
violence" refers to the practices of "dominant systems of a society" that "suppress the avenues of
internal transformation and repress the agency of those whom the society subordinates and
exploits").
157. See generally LAURENCE A- TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 1988).
158. GREIDER, supra note 141, at 26 (quoting David W. Augsberger, Anger and Aggression, in
1 CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PASTORAL COUNSELING 482, 494 (Robert J. Wicks ed., 1993)). Greider
also quotes the Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling, which defines aggression as "a form
of behavior in which persons express their rights, thoughts, and feelings without regard for the
rights, thoughts, and feelings of other persons." Id. at 126 n.59 (quoting R.K. Sanders, Aggres.
sion and Assertion, in DICTIONARY OF PASTORAL CARE AND COUNSELING 14 (Rodney J. Hunter
ed., 1990)). The First Amendment has been held to protect speech suffused even with hatred and
malice, let alone disregard for other persons and their "rights, thoughts, and feelings."
159. See generally Gretchen C. Rubin & Jamie G. Heller, Restatement of Love, 104 YALE L.J.
707 (1994) (exploring this point satirically).
160. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equal-
ity, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1437-40 (1991) (noting that courts do not try to compel parental
visitation); Judith Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart: The
Father's Role After Separation, 53 MARRIAGE & FAM. 79 passim (1991) (noting low rate of pater-
nal involvement when fathers and young children live separately).
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result of what happened to their loved one. 161 A marriage that feels
dead to one or both spouses remains alive in the law.162 Ardor, as I
mentioned, is not an excuse like duress, even if it generates an
equivalent feeling of compulsion. 16 Quaint causes of action like se-
duction and breach of promise of marriage have been on the wane
for decades, and love never had much to do with them anyway.16
Law itself enjoys and uses loveless power, and many Ameri-
cans would have it no other way. A powerful Western tradition
fears the coupling of official authority with supposed benevolence,
as exists for example in Japanese society and government.'1 Di-
chotomies entrenched in American law between "public and pri-
vate," or "law and morals, 166 favor a separation between love and
power. Procedural justice in the United States demands disinter-
estedness and never love. 167 As we shall presently see, however,
emotions do play an important role in the law of aggression.
B. Reciprocity: The Sentiments of Aggression
In relational terms, aggression contains two types of feel-
ings: a sense of having been wrongfully invaded and an intentional
trespass into the domain or space of another. Instead of using
"feelings," however, I will follow a jurisprudential tradition associ-
ated with Adam Smith and refer to sentiments 3 8 In The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, Smith argued that sentimental responses to
situations that affect or involve other people-grief, joy, anger-
help to build effective ethical judgment. 169 Here sentiment means
161. See Benjamin Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1998).
162. See Keck v. Keck, 309 N.E.2d 217, 221 (IlM 1974) (refusing to award divorce on this
ground); Matthews v. Matthews, 661 N.Y.S.2d 115, 115 (N.Y. App. 1997); Gerwe v. Gerwe, 1996
Va. App. LEXIS 21, at *3 (Jan. 16, 1996) CA legally recognizable event is necessary to dissolve a
marriage," notwithstanding husband's protest that his marriage was "dead.").
163. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
164. See Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583, 2586 (1998); see
also Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L, REV. 817,819-20 (1996).
165. See generally Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, 'eightier Than a Mountain: Duty, Hi-
erarchy, and the Consumer in Japan, 29 VAND. J. TRANsNA', L, 45, 62-63 (1996) (citing
sources).
166. See generally James Barr Ames, Law and M1orals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908).
167. See DALE A. NANCE, LAW AND JUSTICE: CASES AND READINGS ON THE AmERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 239-41 (2d ed. 1999) (proposing hypotheticals to explore the concept of judicial imparti-
ality).
168. On this jurisprudential tradition, see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990).




something like "feeling, with a normative component" or "feeling
consonant with cognition and conducive to justice." Human beings
ought to cultivate their abilities with respect to sentiments; actions
that violate the principle of mutual sympathy are unethical. 170
As with our discussion of reciprocity-first utility-second, the
order of the two sentimental elements warrants a short explana-
tion. Why put "feeling of violation" first and "intentional trespass"
second? As a matter of chronology, "making the first move" always
precedes a sentiment of invasion. I have rejected chronological or-
dering here, however, in favor of the torts-rooted premise that the
legal recognition of injury begins in a complaint. 1 1 Unless a person
has declared herself wrongfully invaded, or unless a legal system
can reasonably suppose that it ought to be concerned about a
wrongful invasion, there is no need to engage the apparatus of legal
condemnation. As I have suggested elsewhere, volenti non fit inju-
ria-the maxim that consent and assumption of risk destroy claims
for redress-is less problematic away from the strict confines of tort
law than in the torts cases where it is invoked. 172 A legal definition
of aggression should limit itself to behaviors that their target would
want to stop.
The two sentiments of wrongful encroachment and inten-
tional trespass are related to, and depend on, each other: A crime of
trespass is also a boundary violation. 178 The feeling of violation de-
rives from a perception of having received the aggression of an
agent. Rainwater leaking through a torn roof or past a foundation
into a basement, therefore, cannot be a source of this sentiment
even though the rainwater invades one's home. 174 To differ again
with some definitions of aggression associated with psychologists,
the sentiments of aggression must be attributed to human aggres-
sors; houses invaded by vermin or stray cats do not give rise to a
claim of aggression in the law. Because the law concerns itself with
170. See Mark Y. Moller, Comment, Sympathy, Community, and Promising: Adam Smith's
Case for Reviving Moral Consideration, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 219 (1999).
171. See generally Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37 (2000).
172. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 502
(1997).
173. See Jacqueline St. Joan, Sex, Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing into the Culture of Do.
mestic Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 293-94 (1997) (exploring literary and feminist impli-
cations of trespass across the boundaries of others).
174. Cf. COLEMAN, supra note 34, at 306 (arguing that corrective justice requires a human
agent of wrongdoing).
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relations among persons, its interest in the sentiments of aggres-
sion stays confined to human responses to human provocations. 175
1. A Feeling of Violation
In his classic Asylums, Erving Goffman describes "total insti-
tutions," such as mental hospitals, where occupants are forbidden
to maintain a zone of themselves that excludes "alien and contami-
nating things."176 Whereas most people are privileged to separate
themselves from their larger environment, these inmates are de-
nied such a boundary. Goffman's geographic landscape provides a
beginning description of the zone invaded by aggression. The sen-
timent of wrongful encroachment implicitly recognizes a physical
separation that is denied to Goffman's unfortunates.
Consistent with boundaries according to Goffman, claims of
aggression posit a zone that begins somewhere around the body.
Following John Locke, theorists have worked from the starting
point that human beings have something like an ownership interest
or stake in their bodies. 177 Without contending that people own
their bodies just as they own commodities-an overstatement that
is neither descriptively true nor normatively appealingL-I posit
that the feeling of personal violation refers to space located around
or near the body.179 For legal treatment of aggression, this terrain
covers the space subject to a feeling of wrongful invasion. This
space has been a locus of significant contemporary political theory;
despite the particular and local nature of a human body, the stakes
of its boundaries are high for social institutions like law. Accord-ingly, the body is not too local or trivial to begin an account of ag-
gression in the law. 80
175. Cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 1097b, lines 8-15 (situating discussion of justice and
human nature among "friends and fellow citizens").
176. ERVING GOFFIAN, ASYLUMS 23 (1961).
177. See, e.g., WILLIA1S, supra note 43, at 83 (stating Lockean view about ownership of one's
body). For a critical summary of this literature, see Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodi-
ment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWAL REV. 1331, 1335-42 (1996).
178. See J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. I, ch. XI, at 218 (W. Ashley ed.,
1909) (1871) (protesting the view that all things are property). Peter Halewood argues that
"liberal property theory" and various practices of commodification-genetic technology, interna-
tional trafficking in human organs, and "cyberporn"--support and nurture each other. Hale-
wood, supra note 177, at 1332-35.
179. Jeremy Waldron, hewing fairly closely to Locke, situates personhood in the body and
nearby objects appropriated by the person. JERF-iY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPEnT
183 (1988).
180. See generally ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW (1997) (exploring significance of the human
body in a range of private- and public-law settings). Feminists have identified the boundaries
around persons as an issue of particular import for women and the study of gender. In her book
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2. Intentional Trespass
Here is the right place in our discussion to consider the ety-
mology of the word aggression. The Latin aggredi means to go for-
ward, or to approach an object. 181 Although some speakers of Eng-
lish deliberately avoid "to aggress" because it sounds like a vulgar
newcomer (like "to parent" or "to opine"), the verb is older than the
noun. 182 In its etymology, then, aggression contemplates a person,
or at least a living agent, who goes forward or approaches. Consis-
tent with the irrelevance of violence and harm noted in the preced-
ing discussion, "to aggress" does not necessarily mean to inflict
damage, or to execute an agenda of destruction. 183
At the same time, however, aggression cannot encompass all
forms of purposeful or intentional behavior. Mere going-forward is
not enough to warrant the disapproval, and thus the coercive meas-
ures, of law. Once again, tort theory and doctrine aid the task of
locating a feasible central point.184 The mental state necessary for
an intentional tort is equivalent to the mental state needed for ag-
gression in the law. 185 For purposes of identifying the second senti-
ment of aggression, "trespass"-a flexible locution that has done
similar definitional duty for centuries within tort law186-can cover
the mental state of the aggressor.
on aggression, Kathleen Greider speculates that many women in the United States have not
been taught to insist on the inviolability of the boundaries around them, and may therefore be
less inclined to protest incursions that look wrongful to observers. GREIDER, supra note 141, at
85-86. For Jennifer Nedelsky, feminist thought suggests that human autonomy demands
boundary merger or "constructive relationship" at least as much as "protection against intru-
sion." Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF
CULTURE 163, 168 (Robert L. Post ed., 1991). Catharine MacKinnon has claimed that violability
starkly defines the female gender. CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 160-61 (1989). Andrea Dworkin writes that during intercourse a woman is "entered and
occupied," the boundary surrounding her "violated." ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 137 (1987).
Carol Gilligan associates the blurred or permeable boundaries around a woman's body with an
"ethic of care," suggesting that separation from others per se is not better than, or preemptive of,
a countervailing obligation to recognize and validate the particulars of human relationships.
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 10-12 (1982).
181. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 182 (2d ed. 1991).
182. "Aggress" has been in general use for four hundred years. AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 34 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that "to aggress" has been
"unjustly maligned as a back-formation").
183. See supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
184. Cf Fletcher, Domination, supra note 60, at 357-58 (arguing that in its treatment of
domination, tort is located midway between contract and criminal law).
185. See GERDA SIANN, ACCOUNTING FOR AGGRESSION: PERSPECTIVES ON AGGRESSION AND
VIOLENCE 4-5 (1985) (concluding that aggression cannot occur by accident).
186. See Anita Bernstein, The New-Tort Centrifuge, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 416 (1999).
RECIPROCITY, UTILITY, AND AGGRESSION
According to blackletter tort law, an actor intends to cause
harm when the actor either desires to bring about that harm or be-
lieves that harm is "substantially certain to result" from his or her
actions.18 7 This definition implies an understanding of probable
consequences, so that legal responsibility for the intentional causa-
tion of consequences (such as harmful bodily contact, or invasion of
land, or severe emotional distress) depends on the actor's aware-
ness of the boundary that is crossed. 188 Similarly, aggression re-
quires the actor to know that her chosen behavior invades the ter-
rain of another. She may believe that the target would welcome the
initiative. She may desire benefit for the target, or for other per-
sons, or for society. None of these motives precludes liability for an
intentional tort,18 9 and all of them are consistent with (although not
themselves sufficient to support) a finding of aggression as the law
understands that term.
Like tort doctrine, psychology makes use of the idea of inten-
tional trespass in some of its definitions of aggression. When Arnold
Buss defines aggression as "a response that delves noxious stimuli
to another organism," 90 he evokes the central elements of inten-
tional torts while expressly disavowing from his definition hostility,
anger, and intent to do harm. 19 It is the delivery to another locus
that defines aggression for Buss; as another psychologist puts his
point, non-delivery of a hostile response makes that response not
aggressive. 9 2 Intentional trespass, as I use the term here, corre-
sponds to the stated and implicit definitions of aggression found
elsewhere in psychology. 9 3
187. RESTATEMENT (THRD) OFTORTS: GENERALPRINCIPLZS § 1(2000).
188. "When an actor fires a gun in the midst of the Mojave Desert, he intends to pull the
trigger; but when the bullet hits a person who is present in the desert without the actor's knowl-
edge, he does not intend that result." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt a (1965).
189. Mistake is insufficient to vitiate intent. See Ranson v. Kitner, 31 Ill App. 241, 241
(1889) (holding defendant hunters liable for shooting the plaintiffs dog, which they believed to be
a wolf); Hayes v. Bushey, 196 A.2d 823, 825 (Me. 1964) (noting that "a mistake does not avoid ...
liability for trespass. It is only the intention to enter the land of another that is an essential
element of trespass .... " (emphasis in original)). Good intentions are also irrelevant. See In re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1253 (D.C. App. 1990) (refusing to approve court-ordered cesarean operation
where hospital had hoped to save fetus); Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82
A-2d 458, 462-63 (N.J. 1951) (imposing liability on skating rink for efforts to set the plaintiffs
broken arm, which efforts she had protested).
190. BUSS, supra note 144, at 1.
191. See id. at 3-12.
192. See Thelma Veness, Introduction to Hostility in Small Groups, in THE NATURAL
HISTORY OF AGGRESSION, supra note 138, at 77, 78; see also BARON & RICHARDSON, supra note
144, at 7 (stipulating that aggression is a form of behavior).
193. Contrary to the views expressed elsewhere in psychology that a desire for "violence,"
"hurt," or "harm" is a defining element in aggression, see supra notes 13641 and accompanying
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C. Utility: Societal Condemnation
We have proceeded in sequence, following the torts conven-
tion of starting with the victim's stated or supposed account of
having experienced a feeling of violation, and then considering the
actions of the putative aggressor. In order to bring the utility para-
digm into play, we assume that the sentiments of aggression-the
reciprocity elements-are satisfied. A victim has felt violation; an
aggressor has trespassed. Continuing the metaphor of "into play,"
one may next think of a referee's whistle. Not all infractions on a
basketball court or hockey rink receive condemnation, nor should
they: Refereed sports tolerate a certain amount of pushing at the
edge of the rulebook. Law goes further than sports in the direction
of condoning aggression, in part because so much more social wel-
fare is at stake.
Even outside law, those who define aggression recognize the
costs of too much condemnation. Psychologists understand the de-
sirability of including a reference to societal gain in their under-
standing of aggression, notwithstanding the absence of these refer-
ences in psychological definitions of the term. Gerda Siann, for in-
stance, laments the gap between "social psychologists" who con-
demn aggression as harmful, on the one hand, and "novelists, psy-
chiatrists, psychoanalysts" and "many members of the public," on
the other hand, who will approve of aggression in certain
instances. 94 Siann's point about social psychology is of much more
acute importance to law. Law does, must, and should condone some
encroachments, even when targets experience them as wrongful
invasions.
Which invasions are wrongful within the law of aggression?
The law generally confines-and in my view should confine-its
condemnations to those invasions that are wasteful or otherwise
destructive of social welfare, broadly understood. Those last words
are critical. As the utilitarians Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavel
point out, "welfare" can, depending on how it is interpreted, cast its
net widely enough to include "not merely individuals' levels of ma-
text, many psychologists conscientiously avoid this defining element. See, e.g., SIANN, supra note
185, at 14 (deriving a broad definition of aggression distinct from "violence"); id. at 187-88 (ro-
viewing the implicit definition of aggression in the work of D.J. West and D.P. Farrington); see
also BARON & RICHARDSON, supra note 144, at 9 (making desire to "harm" a defining element,
but only for the purpose of excluding accidental infliction of injury and beneficent pain, such as
that inflicted by dentists).
194. SIANN, supra note 185, at 5-6.
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terial comfort but also their degree of aesthetic fulfillment, their
feelings for others, and anything else they might value, however
intangible."195
Implicit in this Article is a venture at compromise slightly
different from the Kaplow-Shavell attempt to co-opt concerns asso-
ciated with "fairness" into utility. Rather than merge everything
worth having into "welfare"-in Kaplow and Shavell's lampoon-
lexicon, "fairness" means frivolous and wasteful postures, such as a
demand to spend the entire gross domestic product of a nation on a
traffic ticket-I instead see fairness or reciprocity as the beginning
of a claim of aggression, and welfare or utility the end. Unwelcome
incursions cause pain that ought to be honored with attention. But
these measures can also yield happiness and wealth, and every
other synonym for utility.
The gains to society that derive from tolerating or applaud-
ing aggression are varied. We have noted the ideal that celebrates
industrial expansion as progress, and the tort rules that conse-
quently insulate defendants from liability when their bold activities
cause harm. 196 A similar consideration extends past accident law.
"Freedom of contract," for instance, has enriched individual over-
reachers and also contributed to prosperity; even usurious or un-
conscionable agreements create classes of opportunities for poor or
oppressed people that would otherwise not exist. 197 Sexual over-
tures renew human life. Blasting builds tunnels below the earth
and skyscrapers above. New assertions expand rights, invert intel-
lectual orthodoxy, divert assets away from stagnation, and move
capital where it is needed to build more wealth.
These gains materialize at an aggregative level. Yet even at
the level of one-on-one encounters, each individual would if rational
oppose a total ban on all forms of aggression. 19 The utilitarian as-
195. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 105, at 1-2. For an illustration, consider the tort doctrine
of consent, which Kantian scholar Richard Wright deems an embarrassment to utilitarianism:
the law permits an individual to choose "a medically risky cosmetic operation" even though the
expected benefits of this decision "may well not outweigh the expected losses to those financially
and emotionally dependent on her." Wright, supra note 104, at 283. Wright's argument does not
dispose of utilitarian rationales for positive law. Rather, it shifts the inquiry to whether utili-
tarianism can take into account intangibles that bear on the decision of Wrights obstinate pa-
tient, and other citizens whose wishes and preferences affront welfare analyses.
196. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Keating, supra note 46, at 359-60
(discussing Marshall v. Gotham Co., an English case holding that a rare, undetectable risk must
be borne by gypsum miners rather than their entrepreneurial employer, because the only alter-
native is to shut down the enterprise).
197. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 21-23.
198. Not only because he wishes to achieve directly the fruits of his aggression, but because
aggression holds strategic value for him. As game theorists have demonstrated, the decision to
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sessment of various categories of aggression could not attempt to
honor the wishes of individual targets as preemptive of social gains
and losses, even if it wanted to, because individual wishes about
aggression are always conditional.
In sum, the law's decision to condemn or condone categories
of aggression begins with two sentiments-violation and trespass-
and moves to a judgment about aggregative welfare that takes into
account, but is not limited to, an evaluation of the effects of these
sentiments. Reciprocity and utility combine to form categorical le-
gal rules about aggression. In the next two Parts, I elaborate on
this function. Part III presents a taxonomy; Part IV details how law
reformers use reciprocity and utility, changing the law of aggres-
sion as part of making social policy.
III. COMMENTS ON A TAXONOMY OF AGGRESSION IN THE LAW
Consider the chart presented above in the Introduction, now
modified to reflect the application of these three terms.
engage in "outright pugnacity" can be either sensible or foolish depending on an array of vari-
ables, especially the behavior of other actors. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 68-74
(1982) (discussing work of J. Maynard Smith and others on evolutionarily stable strategies).
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Table 2
Condemnation of Aggression in the Law
Area of Law Condemned Behavior Utilitarian Concerns
About a Ban
ANTITRUST predation competition, customer
welfare
CONTRACTS undue influence consistency
duress consistency
unconscionability lost mutual gains
GRATUITOUS undue influence consistency
TRANSFERS
CRIMINAL LAW solicitation of employ- class bias






blackmaillextortion lost mutual gains
entrapment deterrence
aggressive panhandling class bias
PROFESSIONAL solicitation class bias
RESPONSIBILITY
PUBLIC aggression definitional uncertainty,
INTERNATIONAL problems of remedies and
LAW enforcement
Table 2 preserves two of the three original columns, "Area of
Law" and "Condemned Version," renaming the latter "Condemned
Behavior." 199 The eliminated column, "Condoned Version," is reab-
sorbed into a new column, "Utilitarian Concerns." This column
casts the idea of benefits of aggression to society-such as competi-
tion or courtship-into an expressly utilitarian form.200
199. To conserve space on the chart while covering the same concepts, Table 2 puts day-
laborer solicitation in the same box as panhandling.
200. A reasonable case could be made that "class bias" and "gender bias" are fairness objec-
tions, rather than utilitarian concerns. The reason for including them in Utilitarian Concerns is
to note the costs to society of impeding civic participation for members of minority groups. See
John J. Donohue III, Is Title VH Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L, REV. 1411, 1430-31 (1986) (contending
that anti-discrimination laws might increase efficiency).
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The distinctions noted in Table 2 refine the larger claim of
this Article that aggression is a legal concept that unifies divergent
categories of doctrine. The notion of aggression certainly unifies
but, as we see, it also points out fissures and fault lines obscured in
a previous aggregation.20' In duress, for example, we find differ-
ences depending on whether we are in criminal law or contracts.
Furthermore, now that we have identified two aspects of the reci-
procity paradigm-violation and trespass-we are able to classify
doctrinal concepts based on whether the "violation" or "trespass"
element predominates. I would contend that in contract law duress
is predominantly a trespass, whereas in criminal law its force as a
violation appears stronger. Another set of fault lines within a pre-
viously unified whole is in the criminal law category. Criminal law
prefers to site itself inside the mind of the defendant, emphasizing
mens rea as necessary for all traditional crimes. 20 2 If we think
about some of the listed crimes, however, we find that the recipi-
ent's feelings of violation are more central to our disapproval than
the trespass sentiment. If this relative ranking is accurate, then
mens rea may be a more divided and divisive concept than horn-
book criminal law takes it to be. Pedagogical consequences follow. 203
In addition to dividing previously unified doctrinal labels
like duress and criminal law, a legal concept of aggression yields
conclusions about the direction that legal rules ought to take, which
include new unifications. Below I propose three inferences to be ex-
tracted from Table 2.
201. When I presented this work-in-progress at a University of Michigan colloquium, the po.
litical philosopher Don Herzog said that taxonomical analysts are either "lumpers" or "splitters,"
and that this Article puts me in the former category. The claim that there is something called
aggression anywhere, in law or out, certainly bespeaks a lumper. A splitter objection to that
stance appears in the pseudonymously published Aggression: The Myth of the Beast Within. See
KLAMA, supra note 58, at 11-32. But now I have reason to call myself a splitter.
202. See Hamish Stewart, Legality and Morality in A.L.A. Hart's Theory of Criminal Law, 52
SMU L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1999). By "traditional" I mean to exclude hundreds of thousands of
statutes and regulations that provide for criminal penalties, often on a strict-liability basis.
203. For example, instructors who teach criminal law face perennial difficulty with the law
of rape or sexual assault. In a case where the defendant and the complainant credibly dispute
consent, traditional analysis commends a mistake-of-fact approach that would tend to resolve
ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief
Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J. 2687, 2693-94 (1991) (noting bias). Such use of mens rea, though
consistent with the hornbook line in criminal law, pays insufficient heed to the violative nature
of the defendant's act. Students may be outraged either by the pro-complainant deviation from
tradition on one hand, or the neglect of violation on the other. Yet if criminal law does pay doc-
trinal heed to the feeling of violation with respect to other crimes, then presenting violation in
rape cases makes no special accommodation in behalf of complainants.
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A. Putting Violation First
Recall that in Part II, a claim of aggression was said to
originate in the target's feeling of wrongful invasion. Public law,
which dominates Table 2, typically will try to find beginnings else-
where-usually within the perpetrator, rather than the recipient of
action. Criminal law begins with the mental state of the defendant.
Statutes and regulatory law, however, begin at a "macro" level, fo-
cusing on public good.
Differing with this prevailing priority, I contend that in its
treatment of aggression public law does and should follow the pri-
vate-law chronology of starting with either a claim for redress, or
an attempt to imagine sympathetically how the target would regard
the defendant's act.204 The other elements necessary to reach a just
conclusion-a hearing for the putative aggressor and a societal
judgment about whether to spend resources condemning the intru-
sion-will follow later.205 Although listening to, or trying to con-
struct, another person's complaint can be most burdensome, regula-
tion of aggression needs to take this step in order to delineate its
territory.
The initial focus on violation comports with the jurispruden-
tial concern with the human sense of injustice, as contracted to the
sense of justice. 206 In The Sense of Injustice, a Realist-era work that
anticipated Critical Legal Studies, Edmond Cahn contended that
appeals to the sense of injustice are more compelling than appeals
to justice.20 7 Sources ranging from developmental psychology to in-
ternational law emphasize the primacy of the sense of injustice.203
204. On this task of sympathetic engagement, see supra notes 170-72 and accompanying
text.
205. Depending on how much time and money it costs to air the target's perception of wrong-
ful invasion, this exercise could be costly, in the sense of prejudice to the putative aggressor and
wasting societal resources. I do not mean to trivialize this concern, and would not recommend
that the legal rule guarantee any particular quantity of attention to complainants. My point is
only that if one is willing to accept the tripartite division--that is, (1) wrongful invasion, (2)
intentional trespass, and (3) societal condemnation--then the effective way to give each part its
due is to take them up in the order provided here.
206. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 14 (1990) C'[It is both unfair to ignore
personal resentment and imprudent to overlook the political anger in which it finds its expres-
sion.").
207. See EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF LAW
24-25 (1949).
208. Compare LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENTr 636-38
(1984) (marking six stages of moral development, each showing a greater grasp of principles of
justice than the preceding stages), with Ruti Teitel, Transnational Jurisprudence: The Role of
Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2080 (1997) (claiming that the sensa of
injustice is necessary to inform "situated" justice).
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This fundamental starting point provides both moral clarity and the
basis for an informed conclusion about welfare. 209
With the phrase "putting violation first," I mean to suggest
that of the two sentiments of aggression, violation is more central
and fundamental than intentional trespass. This status requires an
extra measure of attention from legal policy-makers. Such measure
is achieved by "putting violation first," in the sense of logical and
chronological primacy: "no harm, no foul."210 Invasions that do not
provoke actual or constructive complaints require no condemnation.
This stance conserves two sets of resources. The aggressor need not
defend herself; society need not determine whether to blow the refe-
ree's whistle.
B. Class Bias
For five of the legal categories in Table 2, I have noted "class
bias" or "gender bias" in the Utilitarian Concerns column. Class or
gender bias can certainly arise in other areas of law on the chart
and elsewhere, 211 but commentators have built an especially de-
tailed literature about these five doctrinal responses to
aggression.2 12 Solicitation of employment by day laborers, harass-
ment, stalking, aggressive panhandling, and solicitation of poten-
tial clients by attorneys all implicate identified political groups.
Looming over the condemnation of solicitation and aggres-
sive panhandling is the idea that it is wrong for certain people-
women, the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, and (in the legal pro-
fession) working-class newcomers-to take the initiative vis-A-vis
209. See Louis Henkin, An Immigration Policy for a Just Society?, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1017, 1018 (1994) (suggesting that international injustice is easier to identify than international
justice).
210. See BECKER, supra note 44, at 293 CThe obligations of reciprocity imply something like
a 'no harm, no foul' rule.").
211. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT.
L. REV. 225, 227 (1981) (describing heightened judicial scrutiny of wills made by gay men).
212. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring
in the judgment); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 573-74 (1993) (arguing that gender bias has prevented street
harassment from being recognized as activity worthy of legal action); Bradfield, supra note 6, at
261-63 (describing gender bias persistent in construction of anti-stalking laws), Allan C.
Hutchinson, Les Misgrables Redux Law and the Poor, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 199, 215 (1993)
(proposing to excuse aggressive panhandling on the grounds of poverty and distress, where cir-
cumstances warrant); Munzer, supra note 10, at 8 (arguing that for many homeless, panhandling
is a matter of fundamental freedom); Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317,
318-20 (1986) (describing controversy surrounding solicitation of clients by lawyers).
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members of a dominant caste.213 Writing about attorney solicitation,
Deborah Rhode argues that the bar maintains "traditional court-
ship rituals" that keep lawyers in "demure, discrete, and decorous
roles."214 Professor Rhode goes on to conclude that the ban is defen-
sible, but only as a means to ends that have nothing to do with
phony gentility: If not for the prohibition, Rhode concedes, lawyers
with large numbers of roped-in clients might tend to neglect them,
leaving vulnerable people underrepresented as a result of attorney
overreaching. 215 This conclusion is incongruous, especially because
it comes after a detailed account of all the benefits that society has
derived from attorney solicitation.216
"Class bias" in the utilitarian box should give the law of ag-
gression pause. When legal rules thwart behaviors among groups
that have been shut out of full citizenship (usually with law-based
constraint) in the past, one has reason to question the fairness as
well as the utility of these rules. I do not mean to suggest that past
victimization constitutes a license to aggress in perpetuity, nor to
overlook the conflicts between two subordinated groups that exist
concerning the aggressive behaviors of one. 217 The proposal is
rather that "class bias" should alert policy-makers to review the
three elements of aggression, especially the first, the reference to
violation. Is this putatively aggressive behavior hurting anyone? If
the answer to that question is ambiguous, move to the third: What
is gained and lost by this instance of legal condemnation?
The first question requires a bit of effort to answer. Public
law does not demand signed complaints the way torts does; sympa-
thetic imagination must suffice. Such an exercise can reverse long-
held conceptions. Consider the decision of various national laws,
including that of Britain, to condone the exchange of sex for money
213. Some women contend that passivity becomes a woman in her sexual or romantic deal-
ings with men. See generally ELLEN FEIN & SHERRIE SCHNEIDER, THE RULES (1997); WENDY
SHALIT, A RETURN TO MODESTY: DISCOVERING THE LOST VIRTUE (1999).
214. Rhode, supra note 212, at 318.
215. Id. at 319, 329-30.
216. Rhode's article was written as part of a symposium on the Bhopal disaster of 1984, and
Rhode praises aggressive lawyers for expanding representation to benefit indigent persons in
India as well as the United States. She notes that tort liability doctrine is fairer as a result of
"global ambulance chasing' she believes that civil rights law would have been hobbled without
solicitation; and she points out that overreaching and other misconduct are hardly unique to
those sectors of practice associated with solicitation. Id. at 324-25.
217. Robert Elickson is amused to report that the Harvard Law Review published within
two years one article asserting a First Amendment right to beg, and another article seking to
protect women from street harassment. He sees this incongruity as proof of absurd political
correctness. Ellickson, supra note 2, at 1170 n.15.
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but prohibit solicitation. 218 H.L.A. Hart tried to say why. Uising pas-
sive-voice constructions, Hart noted the British decision to crimi-
nalize the "manifestation" of street solicitation by prostitutes, to
spare "the ordinary citizen. 219 Feminist commentator Karen Busby
challenges this rationale. As Busby points out, Hart's explanation,
which is intelligible only after the reader gets past its coy pronouns,
reserves all of its sympathy for the affronted male citizen and
spares none for the woman (both Hart and Busby assume the pros-
titute is a woman), who may not have intended to offend. 220 Given
the relative status of these parties, such a condemnation of aggres-
sion deserves to be questioned. Even if analysis ultimately suggests
that the ban on an aggressive behavior ought to be retained, class
bias is an important utilitarian theme that can get neglected in a
political culture that tends to discount the interests of minorities
and subordinated groups.
C. The Opacity of Entities
A final point that emerges from Table 2 is the difficulty of
ascribing aggression to an entity comprised of numerous human
constituents. The volume of literature on antitrust predation and
aggression in international law testifies obliquely to the problem. In
antitrust scholarship, a confident plurality seeks to expunge any
reference to predatory sentiment from the law, while another cohort
would go further and, on the theory that predation does not invade
a protected interest of targeted competitors, preclude competitors
from bringing predatory pricing actions in the courts. 221 One does
not find the same consensus-that aggression as a sentiment is
meaningless-among specialists in international law, but the defi-
nitional challenge has filled countless books, papers, and articles.222
Given this voluminous debate and strife among specialists,
an outsider hesitates to offer doctrinal suggestions for the im-
provement of antitrust law and international law. Whether the
formal concepts of predation and aggression in these fields can co-
218. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
219. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 45 (1963), quoted in Karen Busby, The
Maleness of Legal Language, 18 MAN. L.J. 191, 197 (1989).
220. Busby, supra note 219, at 197-98.
221. See supra note 8; see also infra Part IV.B.
222. E.g., RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 223-81; ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS JR., THE
CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 passim (1972); Anthony Clark Arend, Do
Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 142
(1998).
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here and survive is a question that even learned experts are ill-
qualified to answer. I have, however, offered the contribution of
conjoining two subjects that normally live apart. The conjunction of
antitrust and international law demands an explanation of where
these apparently divergent subjects have significant ground in
common.
Can a firm or a nation experience either of the sentiments of
aggression? As stated, the question is unanswerable. Domestic law
in the United States equivocates on the subject of whether a corpo-
ration is entitled to all of the status-privileges of a person,22 and
international law is increasingly confounded by the status of quasi-
national entities: nongovernmental organizations, semi-recognized
nations of people within hostile borders (such as the Kurds), re-
vived once-and-future countries (like those that used to comprise
Yugoslavia), and popular, well-organized separatist groups united
around culture or language (as exists in Quebec). Without agree-
ment on what it means to be a firm or a nation, one cannot say
whether these entities are capable of transmitting or receiving the
sentiments of aggression.
We may modify the question in a pragmatic direction: Is it
good or bad, from the vantage point of social welfare, for a legal sys-
tem to proceed as if a firm or a nation could be the agent or recipi-
ent of aggression? Bad, according to many writers. Take for exam-
ple the clich6 that antitrust law protects only competition rather
than competitors.2 24 Mere suffering inflicted by a strong competitor
will never suffice for a damages action. Given that lower prices by
competitors do not themselves bespeak wrongdoing, the judicial de-
terminant must be something more than low prices-either "preda-
tory intent," if one focuses on sentiment, or some market-related
indicator of anticompetitive design that will lend a veneer of objec-
tivity to the inquiry. I wish to postpone an explicit discussion of
these two rival approaches,225 but can say now that the advantages
of the latter method are manifest when one considers the problem
of ascertaining the sentiments of putative victims and predators
223. See Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate Phi-
lanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. Sci. L. REv. 835, 83943 (1997).
224. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O.Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). A November
6, 2000 search found 199 documents containing the phrase "competition, not competitors in the
Lexis Lawrev file and 592 in the Lexis Mega file.
225. See infra part IV.B.
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when both are business entities. Market-based indicators of preda-
tion may be hard to administer;226 intent tests are harder still.
Regarding international law, John Burton argues that it is
not only false but also harmful to say that "nations each have the
attributes of persons within a community. 227 This ascription of ag-
gression leads to panicky foreign policy: Believing that other na-
tions are capable of aggression causes state actors to respond in a
way that itself seems aggressive. Burton goes so far as to imply that
retreat from the premise that states can be aggressive would
amount to "a scientific approach to peace."228 Although this wishful
bit of thinking goes beyond the evidence, Burton is justified to ques-
tion the value of aggression as a label for the actions of nation-
states or national governments. 229 The relevant sentiments will of-
ten be hard to find because neither violation nor trespass emerges
clearly from the actions countries take vis-A-vis one another.
Here one can see how the three elements of aggression are
interrelated with some strife, or at least indeterminacy. Nations
penetrate other nations through trade, immigration, tourism, and
cultural influence much more often than through military hostili-
ties; and not every feeling of violation that results from this inter-
course ought to be taken seriously.230 A boundary is a metaphor
even in international relations-no map can tell the whole story
about putative invasions-and so the task of identifying violation
and trespass requires some defining of the lines that are said to be
crossed.231 Regarding trespass, powerful nations do not hesitate to
export economic pressure and ideological influence; and the law of
226. See Jessica L. Goldstein, Note, Single Firm Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law: The
Rose Acre Recoupment Test and the Search for An Appropriate Judicial Standard, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1780-82 (1991) (pointing out difficulties in objective, non-intent-based tests for preda-
tion).
227. Burton, supra note 138, at 148; supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting centrality
of the "nothing personal" conclusion as a basis for deciding that aggression should be tolerated).
228. Burton, supra note 138, at 152. In a question-and-answer session transcribed in The
Natural History of Aggression, Burton held fast, refusing to agree that Hitler's aggressiveness
caused war to break out in Germany in 1939. Id. at 158.
229. One of many vexing questions is whether pro-democracy interventions violate the pro-
hibitions. See Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy,
14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 336-38 (1998).
230. I say so having once spent a year living in Florence, a city with a permanent population
of 200,000 and seven million tourists each year. The sense of siege would press powerfully
against us locals-I used to include myself in that group-during every month except November.
Narrow sidewalks would become impassible. Museumgoers would pile eight deep in front of
paintings. To the real locals, of course, I was one of the trespassers, despite my authentic feeling
of violation.
231. Cf. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at 573 (noting that the paradigm of reciprocity en-
gages "metaphors and... imagery").
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international aggression has never known quite how to treat such
less-than-warlike measures. 2 2 Because the sentiments of aggres-
sion are so opaque within the international-law concept, the ag-
gression label adds very little to understanding conflict between
nations.233 Like some other writers, but for somewhat different rea-
sons, I tentatively conclude that it should be dropped.
IV. CHANGING THE LAW OF AGGRESSION:
Two APPLICATIONS
Two applications have been chosen to share space in this
Part chiefly because they are so different from each other. Civil
rights initiatives are associated with the political left; obstacles to
claims of predation come from the right. Few individuals have spent
time working on both crusades. Few readers, I daresay, would rate
both topics as equally important or interesting.
The odd coupling nevertheless sheds light on the subject of
law reform generally and in particular on the function of reciproc-
ity, utility and aggression as concepts available for deployment by
law reformers. The contention of this Part is that persons who seek
to change the public law of aggression, which is characterized by
the "violation" and "trespass" signature criteria described in Parts
II and III, must reckon with reciprocity and utility. To separate this
analysis of aggression from familiar categories and broaden it to the
level of general theory, I have deliberately eschewed examples from
torts (where the paradigms of George Fletcher hold sway, well-
known as they are to policy-makers and law reformers) as well as
from criminal law and international law, the two areas in law
where the concept of aggression is similarly famous and oft-
mentioned.23 4 Civil rights efforts and proposals to revise predation
both manipulate reciprocity and utility, and urge reinterpretation
of earlier understandings of aggression in the law.
232. See RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 313-14.
233. See supra notes 176-80 (suggesting that the concept of the human body is a reasonable
place to delineate aggression in the law).
234. Numerous Lexis and Westlaw searches undertaken in research for this Article showed
that international law is the area of legal doctrine that contains the most references to aggres-
sion. Criminal law is a distant doctrinal second. No clear third emerged.
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A. Inversions of Aggression: The Civil Rights Initiative
and Its 'onviolence"
Inversions of aggression abound in popular discourse and le-
gal commentary. Injuries that befall women, for instance, have been
said to derive from women's choices, if not from feminism itself.23 5
Feminist scholarship is still compelled to defend complainants
when their protests about rape, domestic violence, and sexual har-
assment provoke rejoinders to the effect that victims as well as per-
petrators perpetrate. Objects are said to be agents, and agents ob-
jects. 23 6 "Why didn't she leave?,"23 7 not "what motivated him to hit
her, and "why did he get away with that behavior?" Regarding rape
or domestic beatings or harassment, "did she ask for it?"238
But rearguard opponents of feminism are hardly the first to
invert aggression. Civil rights movements routinely do so. One
claim found universally in a variety of civil rights movements is
that what outsiders deem aggression must be understood as reac-
tion. According to this characterization, unjust aggression precedes
the anti-subordination endeavor; protests from oppressed groups or
persons are necessary responses to tyrannous conditions. Legal doc-
trines protecting civil rights have formed by these means, after rep-
resentatives of subordinated groups contend plausibly that the
paradigm of aggression-as-failure-of-reciprocity, recognized
throughout American law, justifies various measures of protest and
redress.
The twentieth-century activist best known for leading subor-
dinated persons to struggle effectively against oppression is Mo-
handas Gandhi, whose philosophy, misleadingly called "passive re-
sistance" or "nonviolence" in the West, details an exquisite varia-
tion on aggression. Gandhi described satyagraha in vehement
terms--"an all-sided sword,"239 "soul-force," 240 "a force definitely
235. See DANIELLE CRITrENDEN, WHAT OUR MOTHERS DIDN'T TELL Us: WHY HAPPINESS
ELUDES THE MODERN WOMAN (1998); KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND
FEMINISM ON CAMPUs 6-7 (1993); SHALIT, supra note 213, at 1-12.
236. See generally Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on
Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 832-35 (1999) (noting illustrations where women are
faulted for insufficient "resistant self-direction").
237. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991); see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 149, at 94 (wondering why
Lorena Bobbitt simply did not leave her abusive husband).
238. Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It? The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1576-77 (1992).
239. M. K. GANDHI, THE SCIENCE OF SATYAGRAHA 8 (1957).
240. Id. at 3.
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more active than the resistance that an armed man can devise."241
If Gandhi was right to claim ferocity, then "passive resistance" in-
correctly describes his precepts. 242
Passivity and force also came together in the twentieth cen-
tury with the rise of liberation theology, which pursues economic
and racial justice with reference to religious teachings. 243 The the-
ology most often associated with liberation theology comes from
Roman Catholic sources, but other believers have inverted aggres-
sion in several societies. Activists cast oppression as violence rather
than the simple status quo, and insist on the power, as well as the
victimhood, of subordinated peoples. 244 In the United States, civil
rights movements also invert aggression. Their use or non-use of
the "nonviolence" label is revealing.
As the experiences of Gandhi and liberation theology attest,
nonviolence is certainly not a trait of mere negation or absence; if
nonviolent simply means "not violent," then pet rocks and potted
plants would warrant the label. Nonviolence instead sends a mes-
sage combining threat and hope:
We could destroy you. If we chose, we'd send your blood pouring through the
streets. We'd detonate everything you have built and possess. But we choose a con-
structive rather than a destructive course, to hold you, Oppressor, to your noblest
assertions. Ve evaluate your aggression against us by the exalted standards you
profess. We appeal not only to your sense of justice and injustice, but also to your
practical estimation of how much well-deserved conflagration and chaos you can
tolerate.24
241. Id. at 23.
242. Id. at 25 ("Satyagraha differs from Passive Resistance as the North Pole differs from the
South"); id. at 22-23 (distinguishing satyagraha from Christian nonresistance as propounded by
Tolstoy); id. at 38-39 (noting forceful practices of Buddha and Christ); id. at 121 (calling Jesus
"the most active resister known perhaps to history").
243. The classic statement of liberation theology is GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF
LMERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SALVATION (Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson trans.,
1973). Antecedents extend back well beyond the twentieth century. See generally JAMES H.
CONE, THE SPIRITUALS AND THE BLUES: AN INTERPRETATION 32-56 (1991) (arguing that African-
American spirituals, which refer to ancient accounts like the Book of Exodus, are a type of libera-
tion theology).
244. See e.g., ASGHAR ALI ENGINEER, ISLAM AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY: ESSAYS ON
LIBERATIVE ELFMENTS IN ISLAM 38-49 (1990) (discussing "liberative violence" in the Quean and
other Muslim sources); MANUEL A. VASQUEZ, THE BRAZILIAN POPULAR CHURCH AND THE CRISIS
OF MODERNITY 13 (1998) (analyzing liberation theology in contemporary Brazil); Andrew S.
Levin, Civil Society and Denocratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY INTfL L. REV. 389, 423 (1995) (refer-
ring to "ti legliz," or "little church" in the Haitian language, as a liberation theology); Tamara
Rice Lave, Note, A Nation at Prayer, a Nation in Hate- Apartheid in South Africa, 20 STAN. J.
INVLL 483, 512-23 (1994) (describing role of liberation theology in anti-apartheid struggle).
245. "[Y]ou have a truly explosive situation," according to a posthumously published essay by
Martin Luther King, Jr. "Any night on any street corner in any Negro ghetto of the country, a
nervous policeman can start a riot simply by being impolite or by expressing racial prejudice.
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Nonviolence refers to renunciation, not absence, of the aggression
in which the law, as we have seen, takes a keen interest. For this
reason nonviolence, closely associated with aggression in the legal
sense that I have detailed, has an extensive legal history.246
Looking at civil rights movements that have achieved legal
change in the United States, one is struck by the relative success of
efforts by and in behalf of African-Americans, compared to efforts in
behalf of other groups. The triumph is-to put it mildly-incom-
plete. But what remains to be done in behalf of African-Americans
lies mostly outside law, whereas other subordinated groups have
not achieved as full a measure of formal legal gains. Other groups
lack comparable amendments to the Constitution, major statutes
such as the Reconstruction laws and the Voting Rights Act, and ju-
dicial formulations like "strict scrutiny." It appears that successes
in changing American civil rights law are related to the use of non-
violence-a rhetorical move that, as I mentioned, has little to do
with that absence of physical expression. Aren't women pacific? Gay
and lesbian leaders, disability-rights activists, and proponents of
age-discrimination reforms seldom take up incendiary weapons.
These activists are not called nonviolent, however. The reason they
have not earned this adjective is that they have not made a full case
about aggression-a project still undone in the sense of both ex-
pressing the incursions they suffer and declaring their own power
to act forcefully. 247
Begin with the sentiments of reciprocity. Elements that state
the reciprocity elements of aggression-violation and trespass--
cannot emerge if activists describe their antagonist as an omnipo-
tent force and themselves as passive victims. Reciprocity requires
parity among persons; no one is obliged to treat a worm like a
king.248 Claims for full citizenship under the law, then, are most
And white people are sadly unaware how routinely and frequently this occurs." MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., A Testament of Hope, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 313, 324 (Jaines Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
246. See generally NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Staughton Lynd
ed., 1966) (exploring varied crusades organized to oppose statutes and other types of law).
247. " I never understood why we didn't have gay terrorists," mused film director John Wa.
ters in an interview. "Every other movement did, and it works .... I am not against gay riots. I
think all of it works. It worked for the Black Panthers, for all minorities it has worked." Quote/
Unquote, S. VOICE, July 20, 2000, at 11.
248. See supra notes 76-89 (relating the ethics of reciprocity to Kantian understandings of
respect among persons). It is no disparagement of the wrongs victims suffer to note that they too
are agents. Consider common remarks in adult conversation: "I was bullied as a kid because I
was fat," "Other kids teased me because I wore glasses," "I got picked on because I was a bad
athlete," and the like. One might find these comments whiny, but they contain some assertive
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likely to succeed when they eschew pity in favor of evaluative sym-
pathy, and invite the dominant actor to put itself in the place of the
claimant.249 The feeling of violation gains legitimacy from symme-
tries between the two persons or entities.
In civil rights causes, activists continue their task by point-
ing out an intentional trespass. Typically the putative aggressor
will deny or overlook this complaint. Part of the delay between out-
rage among victims and legal change to redress the problem elapses
during the slow education of aggressors about the nature of their
own behavior. For instance familiarity (such as addressing an adult
stranger as "girl" or "boy" or "dear"), even if it is well-intentioned,
bespeaks contempt as soon as its recipients have protested. Dis-
ability activists have started to convey that human planning, not
prepolitical Nature, builds many of the barriers in their way: uncut
high curbs, steps instead of ramps, narrow doorways, and criteria
unrelated to actual job qualifications. 250 Presumptions of hetero-
sexuality (or monosexuality that limits persons to one sexual pref-
erence) aggressively plant boulders in the path of those who prefer
not to accept, explain, or argue with that default setting.- 1 When
arguments like these gain acceptance, the reciprocity dialogue has
fulfilled part of the civil rights agenda.
The final element of aggression in the law challenges re-
formers to present the favorable consequences of change and the
unfavorable consequences of stasis. "There'll be hell to pay if you
don't" is a message strangely absent from feminism and most of the
other civil rights initiatives that have failed to maximize their
gains in the law. Racial justice enjoyed a couple of contrasting ad-
vantages, notably a stronger textual basis in the Constitution and
elsewhere for its claims, and a near consensus that the concept of
race does not signify much in measures of human identity or worth.
Without denying these differences, I would emphasize the careful
spunk. They are causal propositions, imputing personhood to the speaker. See generally
BULLYING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Elaine Munthe & Erling Roland eds., 1989) (argu-
ing that both the agency and the helplessness of victimized schoolchildren need to be addressed).
249. See Moiler, supra note 170, at 217-18 (describing the proper way to evaluate whether
weeping, for instance, is improper in a given situation).
250. C,. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PrrY! PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEWi CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVMENT 112 (1994) (claiming that"other people's attitudes" are "the biggest barrier").
251. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY x
(1990) (adverting to "presumptive heterosexuality"); Leigh M. Leonard, A Missing Voice in Femi-
nist Legal Theory: The Heterosexual Presumption, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39, 45 (1990) (de-
scribing obstacles for lesbians); Kenji Yoshino, The Episteric Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52
STAN. L. REV. 353, 358 (2000) (noting existence of a "presumption of monosexuality" that classi-
fies persons as either heterosexual or homosexual, never bisexual).
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case about consequences that racial-justice activists built, alongside
the evidence they presented to show violence and trespass. A differ-
ent way to put the same point is to note how cheap it is to abolish
de jure segregation and poll taxes, and how expensive to educate
school children, retrain displaced workers, allocate equal measures
of health care, and fulfill other non-legal imperatives of racial
equality, a task that is still sadly unfinished. Winning a favorable
law of aggression amounts only to an early step, one that should not
be mistaken for complete progress. Yet if social change can follow
from legal change, then proponents of new laws ought to document
the bargain to society that these reforms would offer.
B. Antitrust Predation
The principal antitrust statutes either expressly prohibit, or
else have been interpreted to prohibit, predatory behaviors. Of the
many types of predation strategies-one ABA report has listed six-
teen of the nonprice variety252-predatory pricing has achieved the
most attention from critics, and so predatory pricing case law and
scholarship provide a good basis to discuss predation generally. As
with the civil rights case study, observers can see here that reci-
procity and utility are manipulable toward revision of a law of ag-
gression. Whereas civil rights movements emphasized reciprocity to
show an underlying equality among persons-which equality in-
cludes the power of the downtrodden to assert themselves, and the
prospect that aggressors might experience boundary-crossing from
the receiving end-the attack on predation denies the centrality of
reciprocity.
1. "The Antitrust Offense of Predation Should Be Forgotten 253
Beginning in the early 1970s, an argument emerged that the
law should abandon its condemnation of many kinds of predation;
and in its various forms this view has won significant support, if
not quite a consensus, among the federal judiciary and antitrust
scholars. The gist is that capitalism owes no firm or individual a
living. Aggressive behaviors aimed at business competitors are the
point of business-that which commerce does, and should, reward-
252. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, NONPRICE PREDATION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN
ACT 4 (1991) (ranging from innocuous-seeming strategies as "innovation" and "product promo-
tion" to "burning down a rivars plant").
253. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 337.
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rather than a deviation warranting metaphoric reference to car-
nivorous animals and cold-blooded serial killers. 4
Even if rapacity deserves disapproval, which it does not, the
argument continues, judges have no remedies available that work
so well as the self-cleansing process of microeconomics in the mar-
ket. A rational actor who already enjoys dominance in a market
would not engage in predatory pricing. He faces immediate losses in
revenue by lowering his prices 255 -and the greater his market
share, the greater his revenue losses will be 2 56-and thus he has to
hope that hurting competition will allow him to recoup those losses
in the future. He must discount these future recoupments by the
probability that he will not achieve monopoly power, and then dis-
count them again to present value, because these gains are tomor-
row's dollars rather than today's. 257 In the meantime, customers get
the benefit of his lowered prices. 2 8 There is accordingly no reason
for the law to prohibit or remedy predatory pricing; the disease con-
tains its own cure.
Antitrust scholars have criticized this claim about self-
cleansing. 259 Staying within economic analysis of law, some writers
contend that although predatory pricing is irrational in a single
market, it can pay in multiple markets where a reputation for pre-
dation can bolster anticompetitive behavior. 2 0 Writers interested in
psychology note the heuristics of "decision-making under uncer-
tainty," relating to perceptions about future gains and losses, that
254. See generally Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union TeL Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) C"ost businessmen don't like their competitors, or for that matter compe-
tition. They want to make as much money as possible and getting a monopoly is one way of
making a lot of money. That is fine, however, so long as they do not use methods calculated to
make consumers worse off in the long run.").
255. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Arceda.Turner Test. The Re-
coupment Standard in Brooke-Group, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 559, 559-60 (1994) (noting that "short-
term losses" result from the initial stage of predatory pricing).
256. See John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 295-97 (1980)
(noting that losses initially sustained with predatory pricing vary according to market share).
257. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 272.
258. See Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstruc-
tural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 42 (1994).
259. See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Predation, "Rationality, and Judicial Som-
nambulance, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 811, 856 (1996) (arguing that predatory pricing is "far more
rational and likely to occur" than the argument against legal prohibiton or remedy assumes);
Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High.Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a
Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIo ST. LJ. 1163, 1193 & n.138 (1996) (listing various articles and
studies supporting the existence of predatory pricing).
260. See Timothy J. Trujillo, Note, Predatory Pricing Standards Under Recent Supreme
Court Decisions and Their Failure to Recognize Strategic Behavior as a Barrier to Entry, 19 J.
CORP. L. 809, 822-25 (1994) (summarizing this view as stated extensively in antitrust writings).
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can explain the decision to engage in predatory behavior.2 61 Case
studies suggest that predators have occasionally succeeded in re-
couping their losses.262
Cost-based or "objective" tests for predation split the differ-
ence between the Chicago school and traditionalist defenders of
predation claims, allowing the cause of action to survive in princi-
ple but establishing alternatives to "predatory intent"-usually
showings about the defendant's cost, without which plaintiffs can-
not survive summary judgment. Phillip Areeda pioneered this proj-
ect, publishing with his co-authors a series of tests, all focusing on
short-run costs to defendants. The Areeda formulations varied, but
their common theme was that if you price your goods higher than
what you paid for them, your behavior is legal.263 Herbert Hovenk-
amp, heir to the Areeda treatise, favors below-cost pricing and rea-
sonable chance of recoupment, with intent mostly eliminated from
analysis.264 Judge Easterbrook has emphasized the value of re-
coupment as an indicator for the viability of predatory strategies,
and several of his colleagues on the federal bench agree that rea-
sonable prospects of recoupment are necessary to a claim of preda-
tion.265
Both the Chicago school attack on predation and the tests for
it initiated by Areeda and Turner are noteworthy for their exclusion
of reciprocity in a context of aggression regulation. Antitrust law is
urged not to care about the deliberate decision to hurt a rival
through monopoly-minded price strategies, nor about the feeling of
violation reported to the courts through litigation. Such sentiments
arguably do exist, even within corporations. 266 Utility, though not
261. Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39
Sw. L.J. 755, 760-76 (1985) (noting that one's attitude about risk-taking frequently depends on
one's view of the potential for gain or loss in a particular situation).
262. See Adams & Brock, supra note 259, at 847-52 (documenting the predatory successes of
cigarette manufacturer Brown & Williamson, as presented by plaintiff Liggett & Myers).
263. In formulating a standard to determine defendants' costs, Areeda tried average cost and
marginal cost variations, and also changed his mind about whether presumptions worked better
than per se rules. Cf. PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 724-724d
(rev. ed. 1996) (discussing the Areeda-Turner test and judicial variations of that test).
264. PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 711.2a (Supp. 1993). The
"objective" theme surfaces also in discussions of remedies, as well as tests, for predation. William
Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reduction: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1979) (proposing that predators should not be allowed to raise prices after com-
petitors exit); Oliver Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284, 290 (1977) (contending that temporary price cuts have negligible benefits and that long-
term problems result when a predator raises prices when competitors exit).
265. See generally Elzinga & Mills, supra note 255 (elaborating on "recoupmene' standard).
266. See Adams & Brock, supra note 259, passim.
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shrugged off, is assumed rather than discussed. One may agree that
any futility-such as silly tasks like prohibiting behavior that the
market would prohibit anyway or establishing "predatory intent"
tests that attempt to prove unknowable mental states-wastes so-
cietal resources. 267 But radical reform would ordinarily demand a
better consequentialist case than appears in most predation schol-
arship.
The problem is professional and occupational.2 To say that
"the antitrust offense of predation should be forgotten" or, more
moderately, "the antitrust offense of predatory pricing should be
perceived as a function of costs and recoupment" is to deny that
reciprocity is fundamental to aggression as it is experienced, under-
stood, remedied, discouraged, and alleviated. Economic analysts
regularly practice such denial, and while the recent state of law and
economics literature shows a retreat from the old tenet that indi-
viduals are impelled by financial calculation and nothing more,20
the law of economic regulation, because it is of less interest than
other doctrines to law-and-economics antagonists, still stands as a
fortress, or perhaps a clubhouse, where reciprocity does not enter.
The consequence is an impasse where predatory pricing, and
predation doctrine more generally, is slain and yet not dead. Re-
formers have achieved great successes at persuading judges and
scholars, but their two reforms-denial of predation, and preemp-
tive objective criteria that take reciprocity out of analysis-cannot
achieve total control over predation doctrine because they deny an
enduring perspective. Human beings believe that rapacity exists.
Given the half-chance that antitrust law presents to them-the par-
tial recognition of predation as actionable conduct-they will affirm
the reality of the phenomenon.270 An example of this point comes
from the leading pre-Chicago, traditional antitrust treatise: Law-
rence Anthony Sullivan proposes that predatory behavior may be
267. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (describing opacity of the intent of a
firm); cf. Frank IL Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L REV.
972, 975 (1986) (suggesting that businessmen do not know their own minds, and certainly cannot
articulate reasons for their behavior to lawyers or juries).
268. Both lawyers and economic analysts, according to George Fletcher, tend to like the
paradigm of utility better than the paradigm of reciprocity. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at
573 (speculating that utility offers "misplaced concreteness," as well as the appeal of a multistep
analysis that flatters nonscientists by making them think of laboratory procedures).
269. This footnote could go on for days. Moderations in the last two decades among economic
analysts include such buzzwords as "reciprocal altruism," "path dependence," "behavioral psy-
chology," "norms," and "social meaning."
270. See supra notes 123 and 206-07 and accompanying text (noting the durability of distinc-




identified by two non-cost criteria-it looks odd or deviant, or "jar-
ring or unnatural"; and it is aimed at a particular target rather
than an abstraction like market share. 271 These homely indicators,
long out of fashion in case law and scholarship, identify an essence
to predation that the Chicago school and cost-based tests are ulti-
mately ill-equipped to deny.
To see the phenomenon at work, page through a famous de-
nunciation of predation liability.272 The Antitrust Paradox was the
first book-length treatment of the proposition that because preda-
tory pricing is not sustainable as a means to achieve monopoly
gains, and because it incidentally benefits the public, legal reme-
dies for predatory pricing have created social losses. 273 Robert Bork
wrote The Antitrust Paradox as a jeremiad, and published his 1993
revision mainly to say that fifteen years later he was satisfied with
the judicial response to his lament. What is interesting today about
this book is not its thesis about predatory pricing (which has be-
come conventional wisdom) but its recurring Credo in a another
key: Bork believes with a perfect faith in predation, even if preda-
tory pricing is what others have called "a unicorn,"274 a "myth,"275 or
the modern equivalent of alchemy.2 7 6 Citing no data, Bork confi-
dently asserts that predation through litigation is a successful
strategy, and that plaintiffs' abuse of government processes brings
ruin on competitors.27 7 Bork also believes in predation through "dis-
ruption of distribution patterns," which involves interference with
contractual agreements such as retail exclusivity.278 One sees in
The Antitrust Paradox a kind of conservation of predation. An eco-
nomic analyst expunges predation from his description of how firms
and their agents behave, but the phenomenon survives elsewhere in
the same book; predation can be moved but not quite eliminated.
271. LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 112 (1977).
272. See BORK, supra note 8.
273. Id. at 149-55.
274. E-mail from Adam Pritchard, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School,
to Anita Bernstein, Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School, (Feb. 12, 1999) (on
file with author).
275. Koller, supra note 8, at 123.
276. Liebeler, supra note 8, at 1076.
277. BORK, supra note 8, at 347-49.
278. Id. at 358.
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2. Stopping Short of "Forgotten": A Mixed Judgment
What conclusions about the substantive law of predatory
pricing, and predation generally, follow from casting the topic as a
part of legal regulation of aggression, and from putting it into a
framework of reciprocity and utility? Judge Easterbrook's sugges-
tion that we forget the whole thing has considerable appeal,2 9 but I
have argued that predation will continue to be hard to kill. The "of-
fense" will not soon "be forgotten" because it resonates with the way
human beings, even former Judge Bork, see the world.2 0 Like Pro-
fessor Sullivan, observers can approve of capitalism yet still be
jarred by a particular business practice because it appears both
pointed (at a particular competitor) and dangerous (that is, likely to
succeed in some aim, particularly monopolization).l This two-part
conclusion lines up approximately with reciprocity first, utility sec-
ond. Journalists covering the Justice Department prosecution of
Microsoft told a rapacity story rather than a microeconomics story
not only because their readers are ignorant and editors lazy,2 2 but
because reciprocity is prior to utility. Even if these journalists were
indeed looking for the lowest common denominator, as their critics
say they are wont to do, they started at the right point of origin: the
rapacious monopolist and his targets is the beginning of the ac-
count-not costs, pricing structures, or the way goods are packaged.
I argue, accordingly, that because any effort to expunge reci-
procity from aggression law must fail, the reform of predation law
must live with reciprocity rather than deny its persistence.2 Judi-
cial authors like Easterbrook and Posner are right, I believe, to in-
clude in their published opinions dicta reminding lawyers that most
behavior that competitors dislike is not predation under the anti-
trust laws;m other judges should follow their example. Scholars
should continue the task of unpacking predation into its constitu-
279. See Peter C. Carstensen, Predatory Pricing in the Courl." Reflection on Two Decisions,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 928, 930-31 (1986) (pointing out that predatory pricing, as well as most
forms of predation, is not specifically condemned by statute).
280. BORK, supra note 8, at 347-49, 358.
281. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
282. See generally James Warren, On Ted Turner, Peggy Lee and a Certain Retired Bull,
Cm. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1999, (Tempo section), at 2 (charging journalists with having described the
Microsoft prosecution as a "trial of the century" with focus on celebrity characters).
283. On efforts to deny the embarrassing persistence of irrational stances in the law, see
generally Bernstein, supra note 133.
284. See supra note 254 (quoting Posner); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc., v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc.,
881 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating that business "[r]ivalry is
harsh" and "price reductions are carried out in pursuit of sales, at others' expense but these acts
are not necessarily predatory).
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ents, distinguishing categories of behavior that are part of the bar-
gain for firms and entrepreneurs, on the one hand, from categories
that overstep boundaries, on the other.285 This educational task is a
converse of what civil rights activists accomplished, and a more dif-
ficult project. Whereas civil rights leaders worked to show the pub-
lic old violations and trespasses that had been invisible, antitrust
reformers ought to work to show the differences between competi-
tors' resentments and a good claim.
The utility element of this type of legally regulated aggres-
sion also cries out for more information. Although decades of schol-
arly debate have not resolved the question of what the antitrust
statutes are supposed to do (enhance consumer welfare? protect
small business? discourage concentrations of wealth?), 86 it is clear
that the equating of social utility with lowering prices in the short
term is unfounded, and also unsupported by any reasonable reading
of the antitrust statutes. Herbert Hovenkamp has denounced the
Chicago-school effort to minimize the reach of the antitrust laws as
a covert attempt to repeal the Sherman Act based on arguments
unknown to its framers, and unconvincing to subsequent Con-
gresses: after all, Congress could abandon all legislative proscrip-
tion of attempted monopolization if it were to become fond enough
of certain price theories. 28 7 Such information should be sought
evenhandedly; not all of it will favor retaining liability.2 88
In summary, antitrust predation is a challenging species of
aggression in the law. Like aggression among nation-states, it as-
cribes a feeling of violation and intentional trespass to entities. 289
Popular treatments of antitrust demonize Bill Gates instead of fo-
cusing on Microsoft and the Justice Department because these
feelings are so difficult to attribute to entities; yet these feelings are
too integral to understanding predation to be abandoned altogether.
Unlike aggression among nation-states, however, antitrust preda-
285. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 259, at 1175-78 (discussing predation liability for fraudu.
lent announcements about products that a manufacturer knows will never come to market);
Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff,
90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 561-63 (1991) (summarizing literature on "raising rivals' costs," a category
of predation).
286. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust" Other Than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191-94 (1977) (assessing "fairness").
287. See Prentice, supra note 259, at 1167 n.13 (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Rhetoric and
Skepticism in Antitrust Argument, 84 MCH. L. REV. 1721, 1728 (1986)).
288. Judge Easterbrook is certainly right, for instance, to worry about social losses resulting
from decisions that firms might make to reduce the risk of being sued for predation. Frank
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
289. See supra Part III.C.
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tion presents a very ambiguous condemnation, because it so closely
resembles behaviors that a capitalist economy regards as necessary
to welfare. The analytic sequence of utility-moderates-reciprocity
suggests that while observers might share their evaluative sympa-
thy with (even) a cigarette manufacturer that a competitor decided
to destroy for the purpose of maintaining an oligopoly,=0 the ren-
dering of that sympathy does not answer the question of whether
the law ought to condemn predation.
CONCLUSION
Incursion and boundary-crossing preoccupy all of public law.
Crimes, regulation, and international law present most of the set-
tings where aggression emerges explicitly as a problem to be reme-
died through legal doctrine. In this Article, I have proposed to apply
stances and insights from a branch of private law-tort doctrine
and theory, particularly a taxonomy offered by George Fletcher-to
these important realms of public law. Like torts, aggression is a
relational subject; it works with the dyad of subject-and-object. Al-
though regulations, statutes, and criminal law begin at the level of
public policy rather than this simpler bipolar relation, in their
treatment of aggression they must grapple with the basic dealings
that unite an initiator with a target.
Both in its broad, familiar doctrinal concepts-duty, proxi-
mate cause, injury-and the very idea of a plaintiff, tort law ex-
presses a need to figure out what a victim or class of likely victims
would think about the events it presents in story-form to a court.
This retelling relates to the concept of moral sympathies presented
to jurisprudence in the work of Adam Smith. Similarly, I have ar-
gued, the law of aggression starts with a first step, an attempt to
identify a feeling of violation.2 91 Its second step is to determine
whether the putative aggressor has committed an intentional tres-
pass. Once these two elements, which are the sentiments of aggres-
sion, are educed, the law moves to its pivotal inquiry about welfare,
or what Fletcher (along with others) labels "reasonableness" or
"utility."292 Three perspectives emerge. A recipient wants to be free
of all unwanted encroachment. An aggressor wants to pursue her
290. The reference is to Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 230-
43 (1993).
291. This focus in the law is parallel to the view of one psychologist that understanding ag-
gression is a problem of determining how potential initiators and targets regard an interaction.
MICHAEL GuRiAN, A FINEYOUNGIMAN 143 (1998).
292. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 45, at 540.
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own agenda. And society or community, taking into account these
competing desires, determines which of these two interests war-
rants its support.
Regarding the social or communal element of this balance, I
would mention a year I spent living in Europe. 293 During that aca-
demic year, which began in the fall of 1992, Europeans repeatedly
started conversations with me and many other Americans about
sexual harassment, as presented to the world in the confirmation
hearings of Clarence Thomas. A straw man, or woman perhaps, be-
gan to emerge. The Straw Person, an American/puritan/feminist
figure of wrath, opposes penetration, not only literally but figura-
tively. He or she wants to stop everyone else from having sex but
doesn't stop there: Straw Person would destroy flirtation, banter,
and the sparks of joy that animate a deadening workplace.
"Oh please," runs one American response. Women, it is said,
don't sue over trivial, pleasurable frissons in their workplace. 294 In
writing about the European law and policies of sexual harassment,
I noted the element of caricature in this supposed struggle between
the sophisticated Old World and the puritanical New, contending
that the stereotypes hold value for American conservatives who
want to deny recourse for harassment, as part of their endeavor to
halt equality in the workplace. 295 But there are nevertheless genu-
ine differences between European and American approaches to sex-
ual harassment law.296 That difference, I believe, can be expressed
as a conclusion about what remains after utility moderates reci-
procity. Sexual harassment begins with a feeling of violation and a
trespass. But is the third element of aggression wrong enough to
warrant sanction? All may agree that at some point, harassment
becomes a social evil, though they disagree about the location of
that point. These disagreements are situated in societies. The third
and final element of aggression-societal condemnation of en-
croachments that it deems not worth the price-will yield different
conclusions, depending on what a society chooses to favor and what
to slight.
293. See supra note 230.
294. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169, 1196-98 (1998) (providing an account of the workplace and the origins of both har-
assment and litigation).
295. Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1306-07
(1994).
296. Id. at 1232-34 (contrasting American and European attitudes towards implementation
of sexual harassment law).
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Once it is understood that choices about doctrine reflect so-
cietal views of aggression, the law of aggression becomes more in-
telligible, and thus easier both to reform and to preserve from re-
form proposals. This project of improving the law takes several fac-
ets. I have suggested that improvements include conceptual and
taxonomical clarity: Perhaps mens rea is not really the center of
criminal responsibility, for instance, and duress may not be the
same in crimes as in contracts.297
When taxonomy is improved, law reform becomes clearer.
Consider, in addition to civil rights law and antitrust predation,23 a
topic treated only briefly in this Article: solicitation of clients by
attorneys. Published defenses of the ban make hollow references to
prestige and overreaching, or the appearance of overreaching.2s9
Seen as a problem of aggression, however, the trouble with banning
solicitation becomes clearer. Many solicitations do not engender a
feeling of violation in the target.300 The initiator may commit a
trespass, but this approach closely resembles the underregulated
encroachments he faces from the other side, such as the waivers
that insurance companies occasionally press on accident victims.
Class bias, one of the important utilitarian questions that I have
noted, permeates the ban.301 Both of the sentiments of aggression,
as well as utility, seem attenuated here, if not completely unavail-
able in support of prohibition. Some kind of reassessment, such as
the one undertaken in the District of Columbia ethics rules, be-
comes more warranted after the elements of aggression are applied
to this problem of policy.30 2
Such attention keeps the law honest by forcing analysts and
reformers to talk about the stakes of their actions and inactions.
When a legal rule proscribes aggression without identifying the
sentiments of the initiator and the target, this incoherence is likely
to endure until reformers ask tough questions: "What is this law
297. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part IV.
299. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 787-88 (1986) (conceding
weakness of traditional arguments).
300. See HAZARD & RHODE, supra note 14, at 391-92 (describing potential clients' desire to
receive information about legal rights and legal services). But see Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995) (describing outrage expressed by recipients of written solicitations).
301. See supra Table 2.
302. See D.C. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 2 (stating "It]he interest in ex-
panding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradi-
tion"); id. cmt 5 (contending that there is "no significant difference" between advertising and
solicitation; the Rules therefore prohibit only "in.person solicitation in circumstances or through
means that are not conducive to intelligent, rational deliberation").
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trying to do? Is anyone getting hurt? Which lines, if any, are being
crossed? Are we paying too much for protections we don't need?"
Judge Easterbrook demands to know the price of a vague ban on
predatory pricing.30 3 International lawyers question whether United
Nations denunciations of aggression improve the behavior of na-
tional governments. 0 4 Although such projects have been improving
the law for many years, this process of critical examination would
be refined by the application of distinct, defining elements of ag-
gression.
Another boon of building theory of aggression in the law is
the facilitation of new partnerships with the social sciences. For
example, psychology and law share a concern with prevention of
harm. From their premise that aggression equals fisticuffs and di-
rect impact on human bodies-which this Article has deemed un-
shared by the law30 5-psychologists, asking What is to be done?,
have tested hypotheses about prevention. Several of their findings
pertain to the treatment of aggression within the law. For instance,
psychological studies have determined that among the techniques
that have been tested to limit the effect of aggression-as-bodily-
harm, "cognitive cures" such as exposure to nonaggressive models
were especially effective. 306 The law of remedies, as well as the
criminal law, might use cognitive responses to certain aggressions
under the still-expanding aegis of equitable relief. Without endors-
ing any particular finding or conclusion, I commend generally an
attention to what psychologists continue to learn about the preven-
tion of aggression. Potential gains to doctrine are vast.80 7
Policy-makers who challenge and revise the legal rules of
aggression shape almost all of the law. Almost every area of the law
participates in this influence. Civil rights law is a function of ag-
gression re-perceived.308 Legal concepts of privacy and property,
understood as incursions and safe harbors, can enhance feminist
303. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
304. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 4-13 (presenting the case for, and the case
against, clear definitions of international aggression).
305. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
306. See BARON & RICHARDSON, supra note 144, at 329-57.
307. Imagine trusts-and-estates lawyers skilled in spotting undue influence before it mani-
fests itself in gratuitous transfers; judicial application of the Sixth Amendment right to confront
adverse witnesses with some understanding of what confrontation can achieve and how not to
make it conduce to more rage; urban police instructed in the psychology of panhandling; and
form contracts that steer clear of provoking feelings of violation.
308. See supra Part IV.A.
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needs.30 9 Some scholars of aggression even aspire to replace ideolo-
gies that foment war with ideologies of peace.310 The law of aggres-
sion is a fluid instrument. Once-fixed beliefs about reciprocity and
utility yield over time to new judgments about what behaviors the
law ought to redress, prevent, and foster.
309. See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules feet Feminist Need Respecting Autonomy by
Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. LJ. 1523, 1596 (1998).
310. See LARSEN, supra note 1, at 231. For my response, see supra notes 230-33 and accom-
panying text.
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